Understanding the Psychology of Terror

 

Columnist, Foreign Affairs, The New York Times, USA: 'The attack on New York's World Trade Center was the product of a coalition between three groups of terrorists. First, Usama Bin Ladm and his Egyptian partners, men who in another era might have been Marxists or Leninists. They had de-spiritualized Islam and turned it into a Utopian political ideology. The second group was composed of disaffected youths from Saudi Arabia, members of a vast pool of underemployed young men. The third group was made up of the so-called Europeans, Muslim men who lived in the West and were radicalized by that encounter.

All three groups shared a rage stemming from four factors: First, U S support for Israel and autocratic regimes in the Middle East; second, the fact that their civilizations have fallen behind the West; third, the oppiession of their own government; and fourth, conflicting feelings of guilt caused by simultaneous fascination for and revulsion with the decadent West."

Associate Professor, Northwestern University Medical School, USA: "It might also be useful to examine terrorism from the point of group psychology, for instance the recruitment process for terrorists. Some groups, adolescents, for example, have the kind of attitudes and personal struggles that might make terrorism appealing They are drawn by the promise of adventure or glamour "

Director, Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, United Kingdom: "Terrorism is a criminal activity that can exist in any culture Terrorists are mobilized by a shared identity as an aggrieved group Humiliation leads men to violent crime Terrorism is not a product of any group of countries, but rather of anger and humiliation "

Lecturer in Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, USA: "Many terrorists are attracted by the fact that, in an impoverished country, organized terrorism may pay better than conventional employment "

Adjunct Professor, New York University, USA: "While there is no magic bullet to eliminate terrorism, it is clear it will require education, democratization and economic development to restore self-esteem to aggrieved cultures"

 

World Economic Forum um Annual Meeting

Era of Fear

 

• Has the nature of terrorism changed?

• Is fear a natural response to the terrorist threat?

• How can fear prevented?

 

World Affairs Editor, BBC TV News, United Kingdom: "W destroyed our democracy to defeat terrorism as a result of our fears "

US Secretary of Health and Human Services: "Fear motivate the US to rebuild its national health system, set up a nationwide emergency services communications system, and stockpile vaccines 1 is important that people know the US is prepared Now there is hope a well as fear "

Programme Director, The Centre for the Study of Globa Governance, United Kingdom: "Terrorism now is directed toward civilians to spread fear and hatred and create extremists on both sides We must prevent black holes of terrorism growing in places life Bosnia "

Congress woman from California (Democrat), USA: "If we are not terrorized, then the terrorist cannot win. If people have real information the ability to terrorize will lessen dramatically Government needs to contribute confidence Leadership needs to set an example If US leaders are fearful, the US will be fearful, if world leaders are fearful, the world will be fearful "

Director, Washington Office, RAND, USA: "The nature of terrorism has changed Terrorists want to undermine trust in government and leadership By not providing more information, we are helping that aim "

Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia: "To prevent fear it is important to have international cooperation in border and customs controls, money laundering and arms smuggling If we detect them early enough we can prevent terrorism "

Reader in Philosophy, Birkbeck College, University of London, United Kingdom: "Fear is a natural response Everyone can be a brave foot soldier in the fight against terrorism by living as if there were no threat"

Vice-President, Fred Alger Management, USA: "One way to deal with terrorism is to normalize it, much as we do with road accidents "

 

World Economic Forum urn Annual Meeting.

 

Patterns of Global Terrorism - 2002

 

Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (USA)

April 30, 2003

Cuba

 

Although Cuba signed and ratified all twelve international Counterterrorism conventions in 2001, it has remained opposed to the U.S.-led Coalition prosecuting the war on global terrorism and has been actively critical of many associated U.S. policies and actions. On repeated occasions, for example, Cuba sent agents to U.S. missions around the world who provided false leads designed to subvert the post-September 11 investigation. Cuba did not protest the use of the Guantanamo Bay base to house enemy combatants from the conflict in Afghanistan.

In 2002, Cuba continued to host several terrorists and U.S. fugitives. Havana permitted up to twenty Basque Fatherland and Liberty members to reside in Cuba and provided some degree of safe haven and support to members of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) groups. Bogota was aware of the arrangement and apparently acquiesced; it has publicly indicated that it seeks Cuba's continued mediation with ELN agents in Cuba.

An accused Irish Republican Army (IRA) weapons expert and longtime resident of Havana went on trial in Colombia in 2002. He had been caught a year earlier in Colombia with two other IRA members and detained for allegedly training the FARC in advanced use of explosives. Some U.S. fugitives continued to live on the island.

 

Iran

 

Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2002. Its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence and Security were involved in the planning of and support for terrorist acts and continued to exhort a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals.

Iran's record against Al-Qaida has been mixed. While it has detained and turned over to foreign governments a number of Al-Qaida members, other Al-Qaida members have found virtual safe haven there and may even be receiving protection from elements of the Iranian Government. Iran's long, rugged borders are difficult to monitor, and the large number of Afghan refugees in Iran complicates efforts to locate and apprehend extremists. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Al-Qaida elements could escape the attention of Iran's formidable security services.

During 2002, Iran maintained a high-profile role in encouraging anti-Israeli activity, both rhetorically and operationally. Supreme Leader Khamenei referred to Israel as a "cancerous tumor," a sentiment echoed by other Iranian leaders in speeches and sermons. Matching this rhetoric with action, Iran provided Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups - notably HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command - with funding, safe haven, training, and weapons. Tehran also encouraged Hizballah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups to coordinate their planning and to escalate their terrorist activities against Israel.

Iran also provided support to extremist groups in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iraq with ties to Al-Qaida, though less than that provided to the groups opposed to Israel.

In 2002, Iran became party to the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation. It is party to five of the twelve international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

 

Iraq

 

Iraq planned and sponsored international terrorism in 2002. Throughout the year, the Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS) laid the groundwork for possible attacks against civilian and military targets in the United States and other Western countries. The IIS reportedly instructed its agents in early 2001 that their main mission was to obtain information about U.S. and Israeli targets. The IIS also threatened dissidents in the Near East and Europe and stole records and computer files detailing antiregime activity. In December 2002, the press claimed Iraqi intelligence killed Walid al-Mayahi, a Shi'a Iraqi refugee in Lebanon and member of the Iraqi National Congress.

Iraq was a safe haven, transit point, and operational base for groups and individuals who direct violence against the United States, Israel, and other countries. Baghdad overtly assisted two categories of Iraqi-based terrorist organizations - Iranian dissidents devoted to toppling the Iranian Government and a variety of Palestinian groups opposed to peace with Israel. The groups include the Iranian Mujahedin-e Khalq, the Abu Nidal organization (although Iraq reportedly killed its leader), the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF). In the past year, the PLF increased its operational activity against Israel and sent its members to Iraq for training for future terrorist attacks.

Baghdad provided material assistance to other Palestinian terrorist groups that are in the forefront of the antiradar. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, HAMAS, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad are the three most important groups to whom Baghdad has extended outreach and support efforts.

Saddam paid the families of Palestinian suicide bombers to encourage Palestinian terrorism, channeling $25,000 since March through the ALF alone to families of suicide bombers in Gaza and the West Bank. Public testimonials by Palestinian civilians and officials and cancelled checks captured by Israel in the West Bank venfy the transfer of a considerable amount of Iraqi money.

The presence of several hundred Al-Qaida operatives fighting with the small Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam in the northeastern corner of Iraqi Kurdistan - where the IIS operates - is well documented. Iraq has an agent in the most senior levels of Ansar al-Islam as well. In addition, small numbers of highly placed Al-Qaida militants were present in Baghdad and areas of Iraq that Saddam controls. It is inconceivable these groups were in Iraq without the

knowledge and acquiescence of Saddam's regime. In the past year, Al-Qaida operatives in northern Iraq concocted suspect chemicals under the direction of senior Al-Qaida associate Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and tried to smuggle them into Russia, Western Europe, and the United States for terrorist operations.

Iraq is a party to five of the twelve international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

 

Libya

 

In 2002, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi continued the efforts he undertook following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks to identify Libya with the war on terrorism and the struggle against Islamic extremism. In August, Qadhafi told visiting British officials that he regards Usama Bin Ladin and his Libyan followers a threat to Libya. In his 1 September speech, he declared that Libya would combat members of Al-Qaida and "heretics" - a likely reference to Libyan extremists allied with Al-Qaida and opposed to his regime - as doggedly as the United States did. He further claimed that all political prisoners would be released and that the Libyan Government would henceforth only hold members of Al-Qaida. Libya appears to have curtailed its support for international terrorism, although it may maintain residual contacts with some of its former terrorist clients.

Libya's past record of terrorism continued to hinder Qadhafi's efforts to shed Libya's panah status in 2002. In March, a Scottish appellate court upheld the conviction - originally returned in January 2001 - of Libyan intelligence agent Abdel Basset Ah al-Megrahi for murder in connection with planting an explosive device on Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988. The explosion killed all 259 passengers and crew on board and eleven persons on the ground in Lockerbie, Scotland. There have been reports of a proposed out-of-court settlement of a suit brought by Pan Am Flight 103 family members against Libya, but by year's end it has not been concluded.

Despite progress toward the payment of appropriate compensation, at year's end Libya had yet to comply with the remaining UN Security Council requirements related to Pan Am Flight 103, necessary for the permanent lifting of UN sanctions, including accepting responsibility for the actions of its officials.

In October, lawyers representing the seven U.S. citizens who died in the bombing of UTA Flight 772 in 1989 - for which a French court convicted six Libyans in absentia in 1999 - filed a suit against Libya and Qadhafi, reportedly seeking three billion dollars in compensation. The same month, Libya reportedly pledged to French authorities to increase payments already made to victims of the UTA bombing following the French court ruling in 1999.

In 2002, Libya became a party to the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. It is a party to all the twelve international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

 

North Korea

 

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) response to international efforts to combat terrorism was disappointing throughout 2002, although in a statement released after the September 11 attacks, the DPRK had reiterated its public policy of opposing terrorism and any support for terrorism. In 2001, following the September 11 attacks, it also signed the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and became a party to the Convention against the Taking of Hostages.

Despite the urging of the international community, however, North Korea did not take substantial steps to cooperate in efforts to combat terrorism. Its initial and supplementary reports to the UN Counterterrorism Committee on actions it had undertaken to comply with its obligations under UNSCR 1373 were largely uninformative and nonresponsive. It did not respond to previous U.S. proposals for discussions on terrorism and did not report any efforts to freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts that UNSCR 1373, among other things, requires all states to do.

North Korea is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since 1987. It has sold weapons to several terrorist groups, however, even as it reiterated its opposition to all forms of international terrorism. Pyongyang also has provided safe haven to several Japanese Red Army members who participated in the hijacking of a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970.

Pyongyang continued to sell ballistic missile technology to countries designated by the United States as state sponsors of terrorism, including Syria and Libya.

North Korea is a party to six of the twelve international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Sudan

 

Sudan was cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts before 11 September 2001, which included a close relationship with various U.S. Government agencies to investigate and apprehend extremists suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. Sudan is a party to eleven of the twelve international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. Sudan also has participated in regional efforts to end the civil war that has been ongoing since 1983 - a U.S. policy priority that parallels the U.S. objective of having Sudan deny safe haven to terrorists.

While concerns remain regarding Sudanese Government support for certain terrorist groups, such as HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, the United States is pleased with Sudan's cooperation and the progress being made in their antiterrorist activities.

 

Syria

 

The Syrian Government has continued to provide political and limited material support to a number of Palestinian groups, including allowing them to maintain headquarters or offices in Damascus. Some of these groups have committed terrorist acts, but the Syrian Government insists that their Damascus offices undertake only political and informational activities. The most notable Palestinian rejectionist groups in Syria are the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS). Syria also continued to permit Iranian resupply, via Damascus, of Hizballah in Lebanon. Nonetheless, the Syrian Government has not been implicated directly in an act of terrorism since 1986.

At the UN Security Council and in other multilateral fora, Syria has taken a leading role in espousing the view that Palestinian and Lebanese terrorist groups fighting Israel are not terrorists; it also has used its voice in the UN Security Council to encourage international support for Palestinian national aspirations and denounce Israeli actions in the Palestinian territories as "state terrorism."

The Syrian Government has repeatedly assured the United States that it will take every possible measure to protect U.S. citizens and facilities from terrorists in Syria. In times of increased threat, it has increased police protection around the U.S. Embassy. During the past five years, there have been no acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens in Syria. The Government of Syria has cooperated significantly with the United States and other foreign governments against Al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations and individuals. It also has discouraged any signs of public support for Al-Qaida, including in the media and at mosques

In 2002, Syria became a party to the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, making it party to five of the twelve international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

 

State Sponsor: Implications

 

Designating countries that repeatedly support international terrorism (i.e., placing a country on the "terrorism list") imposes four main sets of U.S. Government sanctions:

1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales.

2. Controls over exports of dual use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist list country's military capability or ability to support terrorism.

3. Prohibitions on economic assistance.

4. Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including:

• Requiring the United States to oppose loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions.

• Lifting diplomatic immunity to allow families of terrorist victims to file civil lawsuits in U.S. courts.

• Denying companies and individuals tax credits for income earned in terrorist list countries.

• Denial of duty-free treatment for goods exported to the United States.

• Authority to prohibit any U.S. person from engaging in a financial transaction with a terrorist list government without a Treasury Department license.

• Prohibition of Defense Department contracts above $100,000 with companies controlled by terrorist list states.

 

An Informal Watchlist

 

There is utility in drawing to Congress' attention countries that do not currently qualify for inclusion in the terrorism list but where added scrutiny may be warranted. It would reflect legitimate concerns of those in the intelligence and policy community and might serve as an informal warning mechanism to countries that their activities are being scrutinized. For example, the State Department warned Pakistan in January 1993 that it was under ''active continuing review" to determine whether it should be placed on the terrorism list. When the list came out in April 1993, Pakistan was not on it. A similar warning was issued to Pakistan in January 2000. Sudan was also warned that it was being subjected to special review prior to its being placed on the terrorism list in August 1993.

In 2000, some informally discussed candidates for such a list include (1) Afghanistan, which is characterized as "a training ground and base of operations" for worldwide terrorist activities. Concerns are that Islamic fundamentalist terrorists linked to numerous international plots continue to train and operate out of the country and/or enter or exit with impunity, and more specifically that the Taliban continues to offer sanctuary to Usama Bin Laden and his associated terror networks; (2) Pakistan - Pakistan has tolerated terrorists living and moving freely within its territory; supported groups that engage in violence in Kashmir; and is "providing the Taliban with material, fuel, funding, technical assistance, and military advisers;" (3) Lebanon -ongoing concern exists over terrorist groups operating with impunity from there, often under Syrian protection, in areas ostensibly controlled by the Government of Lebanon; and (4) Yemen - despite growing military cooperation and assistance in the U.S.S. Cole bombing investigation, Yemen, a nation where a thriving kidnapping industry flourishes in remote areas, remains a safe haven for international terrorist groups with the Government of Yemen, apparently unable "to discourage the terrorist presence in Yemen." There is a growing concern in U.S. policy circles that Chechnya may increasingly become a magnet for Islamic radicals. However, concern exists that "increased radicalization of Islamist populations connected to the Chechnya conflict would encourage violence and spread instability elsewhere in Russia and beyond." Concerns also remain that militant Iranian elements and militants linked to Usama Bin Ladin remaining in the territory of Nations of the former Yugoslavia may resort to terrorist violence.

 

"Congressional Research Service " 2000