Chapter 4. The conduct of war

“Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness.” ¹

—Sun Tzu

“Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him w here he has taken no precautions. ”²

—Sun Tzu

“Many years ago, as a cadet hoping some day to be an officer, I was poring over the ‘Principles of War,’ listed in the old Field Service Regulations, when the Sergeant-Major came up to me. He surveyed me with kindly amusement. ‘Don’t bother your head about all them things, me lad,’ he said. ‘There’s only one principle of war and that’s this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him most, when he ain’t lookin’!’”³

—Sir William Slim

The sole justification for the United States Marine Corps is to secure or protect national policy objectives by military force when peaceful means alone cannot. How the Marine Corps proposes to accomplish this mission is the product of our understanding of the nature and the theory of war and must be the guiding force behind our preparation for war.

THE CHALLENGE

The challenge is to identify and adopt a concept of warfighting consistent with our understanding of the nature and theory of war and the realities of the modern battlefield. What exactly does this require? It requires a concept of warfighting that will function effectively in an uncertain, chaotic, and fluid environment in fact, one that will exploit these conditions to advantage. It requires a concept that, recognizing the time-competitive rhythm of war, generates and exploits superior tempo and velocity. It requires a concept that is consistently effective across the full spectrum of conflict, because we cannot attempt to change our basic doctrine from situation to situation and expect to be proficient. It requires a concept which recognizes and exploits the fleeting opportunities which naturally occur in war.

It requires a concept which takes into account the moral as well as the physical forces of war, because we have already concluded that moral forces form the greater part of war. It requires a concept with which we can succeed against a numerically superior foe, because we can no longer presume a numerical advantage. And, especially in expeditionary situations in which public support for military action may be tepid and short-lived, it requires a concept with which we can win quickly against a larger foe on his home soil, with minimal casualties and limited external support.

MANEUVER WARFARE

The Marine Corps concept for winning under these conditions is a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver. But in order to fully appreciate what we mean by maneuver we need to clarify the term. The traditional understanding of maneuver is a spatial one; that is, we maneuver in space to gain a positional advantage.⁴ However, in order to maximize the usefulness of maneuver, we must consider maneuver in time as well; that is, we generate a faster operational tempo than the enemy to gain a temporal advantage. It is through maneuver in both dimensions that an inferior force can achieve decisive superiority at the necessary time and place.

Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope.

From this definition we see that the aim in maneuver warfare is to render the enemy incapable of resisting by shattering his moral and physical cohesion his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole rather than to destroy him physically through incremental attrition, which is generally more costly and timeconsuming. Ideally, the components of his physical strength that remain are irrelevant because we have paralyzed his ability to use them effectively. Even if an outmaneuvered enemy continues to fight as individuals or small units, we can destroy the remnants with relative ease because we have eliminated his ability to fight effectively as a force.

This is not to imply that firepower is unimportant. On the contrary, the suppressive effects of firepower are essential to our ability to maneuver. Nor do we mean to imply that we will pass up the opportunity to physically destroy the enemy. We will concentrate fires and forces at decisive points to destroy enemy elements when the opportunity presents itself and when it fits our larger purposes. But the aim is not an unfocused application of firepower for the purpose of incrementally reducing the enemy’s physical strength. Rather, it is the selective application of firepower in support of maneuver to contribute to the enemy’s shock and moral disruption. The greatest value of firepower is not physical destruction the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly but the moral dislocation it causes.

If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the enemy’s cohesion, the immediate object toward that end is to create a situation in which he cannot function. By our actions, we seek to pose menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly and faster than the enemy can keep up with them. The enemy must be made to see his situation not only as deteriorating, but deteriorating at an ever-increasing rate. The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist.

Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of combat, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. Through the use of greater tempo and velocity, we seek to establish a pace that the enemy cannot maintain so that with each action his reactions are increasingly late until eventually he is overcome by events.

Also inherent is the need for violence, not so much as a source of physical attrition but as a source of moral dislocation. Toward this end, we concentrate strength against critical enemy vulnerabilities, striking quickly and boldly where, when, and how it will cause the greatest damage to our enemy’s ability to fight. Once gained or found, any advantage must be pressed relentlessly and unhesitatingly. We must be ruthlessly opportunistic, actively seeking out signs of weakness, against which we will direct all available combat power. And when the decisive opportunity arrives, we must exploit it fully and aggressively, committing every ounce of combat power we can muster and pushing ourselves to the limits of exhaustion.

The final weapon in our arsenal is surprise, the combat value of which we have already recognized. By studying our enemy we will attempt to appreciate his perceptions. Through deception we will try to shape his expectations. Then we will dislocate them by striking at an unexpected time and place. In order to appear unpredictable, we must avoid set rules and patterns, which inhibit imagination and initiative. In order to appear ambiguous and threatening, we should operate on axes that offer several courses of action, keeping the enemy unclear as to which we will choose.

PHILOSOPHY OF COMMAND

It is essential that our philosophy of command support the way we fight. First and foremost, in order to generate the tempo of operations we desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command must be decentralized. That is, subordinate commanders must make decisions on their own initiative, based on their understanding of their senior’s intent, rather than passing information up the chain of command and waiting for the decision to be passed down. Further, a competent subordinate commander who is at the point of decision will naturally have a better appreciation for the true situation than a senior some distance removed. Individual initiative and responsibility are of paramount importance. The principal means by which we implement decentralized control is through the use of mission tactics, which we will discuss in detail later.

Second, since we have concluded that war is a human enterprise and no amount of technology can reduce the human dimension, our philosophy of command must be based on human characteristics rather than on equipment or procedures. Communications equipment and command and staff procedures can enhance our ability to command, but they must not be used to replace the human element of command. Our philosophy must not only accommodate but must exploit human traits such as boldness, initiative, personality, strength of will, and imagination.

Our philosophy of command must also exploit the human ability to communicate implicitly. ⁵ We believe that implicit communication - to communicate through mutual understanding, using a minimum of key, well-understood phrases or even anticipating each other’s thoughts is a faster, more effective way to communicate than through the use of detailed, explicit instructions. We develop this ability through familiarity and trust, which are based on a shared philosophy and shared experience. This concept has several practical implications. First, we should establish long-term working relationships to develop the necessary familiarity and trust. Second, key people - “actuals” should talk directly to one another when possible, rather than through communicators or messengers. Third, we should communicate orally when possible, because we communicate also in how we talk; our inflections and tone of voice. And fourth, we should communicate in person when possible, because we communicate also through our gestures and bearing.

A commander should command from well forward. This allows him to see and sense firsthand the ebb and flow of combat, to gain an intuitive appreciation for the situation which he cannot obtain from reports. It allows him to exert his personal influence at decisive points during the action. It also allows him to locate himself closer to the events that will influence the situation so that he can observe them directly and circumvent the delays and inaccuracies that result from passing information up the chain of command.

Finally, we recognize the importance of personal leadership. Only by his physical presence by demonstrating the willingness to share danger and privation can the commander fully gain the trust and confidence of his subordinates.

We must remember that command from the front does not equate to oversupervision of subordinates.

As part of our philosophy of command we must recognize that war is inherently disorderly, uncertain, dynamic, and dominated by friction. Moreover, maneuver warfare, with its emphasis on speed and initiative, is by nature a particularly disorderly style of war. The conditions ripe for exploitation are normally also very disorderly, For commanders to try to gain certainty as a basis for actions, maintain positive control of events at all times, or shape events to fit their plans is to deny the very nature of war. We must therefore be prepared to cope even better, to thrive in an environment of chaos, uncertainty, constant change, and friction. If we can come to terms with those conditions and thereby limit their debilitating effects, we can use them as a weapon against a foe who does not cope as well.

In practical terms this means that we must not strive for certainty before we act for in so doing we will surrender the initiative and pass up opportunities. We must not try to maintain positive control over subordinates since this will necessarily slow our tempo and inhibit initiative. We must not attempt to impose precise order to the events of combat since this leads to a formulistic approach to war. And we must be prepared to adapt to changing circumstances and exploit opportunities as they arise, rather than adhering insistently to predetermined plans.

There are several points worth remembering about our command philosophy. First, while it is based on our warfighting style, this does not mean it applies only during war. We must put it into practice during the preparation for war as well. We cannot rightly expect our subordinates to exercise boldness and initiative in the field when they are accustomed to being oversupervised in the rear. Whether the mission is training, procuring equipment, administration, or police call, this philosophy should apply.

Next, our philosophy requires competent leadership at all levels. A centralized system theoretically needs only one competent person, the senior commander, since his is the sole authority. But a decentralized system requires leaders at all levels to demonstrate sound and timely judgment. As a result, initiative becomes an essential condition of competence among commanders.

Our philosophy also requires familiarity among comrades because only through a shared understanding can we develop the implicit communication necessary for unity of effort. And, perhaps most important, our philosophy demands confidence among seniors and subordinates.

SHAPING THE BATTLE

Since our goal is not just the cumulative attrition of enemy strength, it follows that we must have some scheme for how we expect to achieve victory. That is, before anything else, we must conceive our vision of how we intend to win.

The first requirement is to establish our intent; what we want to accomplish and how. Without a clearly identified intent, the necessary unity of effort is inconceivable. We must identify that critical enemy vulnerability which we believe will lead most directly to accomplishing our intent. Having done this, we can then determine the steps necessary to achieve our intent. That is, we must shape the battle to our advantage in terms of both time and space. Similarly, we must try to see ourselves through our enemy’s eyes in order to identify our own vulnerabilities which he may attack and to anticipate how he will try to shape the battle so we can counteract him. Ideally, when the moment of engagement arrives, the issue has already been resolved: through our orchestration of the events leading up to the encounter, we have so shaped the conditions of war that the result is a matter of course. We have shaped the action decisively to our advantage.

To shape the battle, we must project our thoughts forward in time and space. This does not mean that we establish a detailed timetable of events. We have already concluded that war is inherently disorderly, and we cannot expect to shape its terms with any sort of precision. We must not become slaves to a plan. Rather, we attempt to shape the general conditions of war; we try to achieve a certain measure of ordered disorder. Examples include canalizing enemy movement in a desired direction, blocking or delaying enemy reinforcements so that we can fight a piecemealed enemy rather than a concentrated one, shaping enemy expectations through deception so that we can exploit those expectations, or attacking a specific enemy capability to allow us to maximize a capability of our own such as launching a campaign to destroy his air defenses so that we can maximize the use of our own aviation. We should also try to shape events in such a way that allows us several options so that by the time the moment of encounter arrives we have not restricted ourselves to only one course of action.

The further ahead we think, the less our actual influence becomes. Therefore, the further ahead we consider, the less precision we should attempt to impose. Looking ahead thus becomes less a matter of influence and more a matter of interest. As events approach and our ability to influence them grows, we have already developed an appreciation for the situation and how we want to shape it. ⁶

Also, the higher our echelon of command, the greater is our sphere of influence and the further ahead in time and space we must seek to impose our will. Senior commanders developing and pursuing military strategy look ahead weeks, months, or more, and their areas of influence and interest will encompass entire theaters. Junior commanders fighting the battles and engagements at hand are concerned with the coming hours, even minutes, and the immediate field of battle. But regardless of the spheres of influence and interest, it is essential to have some vision of the final result we want and how we intend to shape the action in time and space to achieve it.

DECISION MAKING

Decision making is essential to the conduct of war since all actions are the result of decisions or of nondecisions.⁷ If we fail to make a decision out of lack of will, we have willingly surrendered the initiative to our foe. If we consciously postpone taking action for some reason, that is a decision. Thus, as a basis for action, any decision is generally better than no decision.

Since war is a conflict between opposing wills, we cannot make decisions in a vacuum. We must make our decisions in light of the enemy’s anticipated reactions and counteractions, recognizing that while we are trying to impose our will on our enemy, he is trying to do the same to us.

Whoever can make and implement his decisions consistently faster gains a tremendous, often decisive advantage. Decision making thus becomes a time-competitive process, and timeliness of decisions becomes essential to generating tempo. Timely decisions demand rapid thinking, with consideration limited to essential factors. We should spare no effort to accelerate our decision-making ability.

A military decision is not merely a mathematical computation. Decision making requires both the intuitive skill to recognize and analyze the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. This ability is the product of experience, education, intelligence, boldness, perception, and character.

We should base our decisions on awareness rather than on mechanical habit. That is, we act on a keen appreciation for the essential factors that make each situation unique instead of from conditioned response.

We must have the moral courage to make tough decisions in the face of uncertainty and accept full responsibility for those decisions when the natural inclination would be to postpone the decision pending more complete information. To delay action in an emergency because of incomplete information shows a lack of moral courage. We do not want to make rash decisions, but we must not squander opportunities while trying to gain more information.

We must have the moral courage to make bold decisions and accept the necessary degree of risk when the natural inclination is to choose a less ambitious tack, for “in audacity and obstinacy will be found safety.”⁸

Finally, since all decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty and since every situation is unique, there is no perfect solution to any battlefield problem. Therefore, we should not agonize over one. The essence of the problem is to select a promising course of action with an acceptable degree of risk, and to do it more quickly than our foe. In this respect, “a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week.”⁹

MISSION TACTICS

Having described the object and means of maneuver warfare and its philosophy of command, we will next discuss how we put maneuver warfare into practice. First is through the use of mission tactics. Mission tactics are just as the name implies: the tactic of assigning a subordinate mission without specifying how the mission must be accomplished.¹⁰ We leave the manner of accomplishing the mission to the subordinate, thereby allowing him the freedom and establishing the duty to take whatever steps he deems necessary based on the situation. The senior prescribes the method of execution only to the degree that is essential for coordination. It is this freedom for initiative that permits the high tempo of operations that we desire. Uninhibited by restrictions from above, the subordinate can adapt his actions to the changing situation. He informs his commander what he has done, but he does not wait for permission.

It is obvious that we cannot allow decentralized initiative without some means of providing unity, or focus, to the various efforts. To do so would be to dissipate our strength. We seek unity, not through imposed control, but through harmonious initiative and lateral coordination.

COMMANDER’S INTENT

We achieve this harmonious initiative in large part through the use of the commander’s intent. There are two parts to a mission: the task to be accomplished and the reason, or intent. 11 The task describes the action to be taken while the intent describes the desired result of the action. Of the two, the intent is predominant. While a situation may change, making the task obsolete, the intent is more permanent and continues to guide our actions. Understanding our commander’s intent allows us to exercise initiative i in harmony with the commander’s desires.

In order to maintain our focus on the enemy, we should try to express intent in terms of the enemy. The intent should answer the question: What do I want to do to the enemy? This may not be possible in all cases, but it is true in the vast majority. The intent should convey the commander’s vision. It is not satisfactory for the intent to be “to defeat the enemy.” To win is always our ultimate goal, so an intent like this conveys nothing.

From this discussion, it is obvious that a clear explanation and understanding of intent is absolutely essential to unity of effort. It should be a part of any mission. The burden of understanding falls on senior and subordinate alike. The senior must make perfectly clear the result he expects, but in such a way that does not inhibit initiative. Subordinates must have a clear understanding of what their commander is thinking. Further, they should understand the intent of the commander two levels up. In other words, a platoon commander should know the intent of his battalion commander, or a battalion commander the intent of his division commander.

 

FOCUS OF EFFORT

Another tool for providing unity is through the focus of effort. Of all the efforts going on within our command, we recognize the focus of effort as the most critical to success.

All other efforts must support it. In effect, we have decided: This is how I will achieve a decision; everything else is secondary.

We cannot take lightly the decision of where and when to focus our efforts. Since the focus of effort represents our bid for victory, we must direct it at that object which will cause the most decisive damage to the enemy and which holds the best opportunity of success. It involves a physical and moral commitment, although not an irretrievable one. It forces us to concentrate decisive combat power just as it forces us to accept risk. Thus, we focus our effort against critical enemy vulnerability, exercising strict economy elsewhere.

Normally, we designate the focus of effort by assigning one unit responsibility for accomplishing that effort. That unit becomes the representation of the focus of effort. It becomes clear to all other units in the command that they must support that unit in its efforts. Like the commander’s intent, the focus of effort becomes a harmonizing force. Faced with a decision, we ask ourselves: “How can I best support the focus of effort?”

Each commander should establish a focus of effort for each mission. As the situation changes, the commander may shift the focus of effort, redirecting the weight of his combat power in the direction that offers the greatest success. In this way he exploits success; he does not reinforce failure.

SURFACES AND GAPS

Put simply, surfaces are hard spots enemy strengths - and gaps are soft spots enemy weaknesses. We avoid enemy strength and focus our efforts against enemy weakness, since pitting strength against weakness reduces casualties and is more likely to yield decisive results. Whenever possible, we exploit existing gaps. Failing that, we create gaps.

Gaps may in fact be physical gaps in the enemy’s dispositions, but they may also be any weakness in time or space: a moment in time when the enemy is overexposed and vulnerable, a seam in an air defense umbrella, an infantry unit caught unprepared in open terrain, or a boundary between two units.

Similarly, a surface may be an actual strongpoint, or it may be any enemy strength: a moment when the enemy has just replenished and consolidated his position or an integrated air defense system.

An appreciation for surfaces and gaps requires a certain amount of judgment. What is a surface in one case may be a gap in another. For example, a forest which is a surface to an armored unit because it restricts vehicle movement can be a gap to an infantry unit which can infiltrate through it. Furthermore, we can expect the enemy to disguise his dispositions in order to lure us against a surface that appears to be a gap.¹²

Due to the fluid nature of war, gaps will rarely be permanent and will usually be fleeting. To exploit them demands flexibility and speed. We must actively seek out gaps by continuous and aggressive reconnaissance. Once we locate them, we must exploit them by funneling our forces through rapidly. For example, if our focus of effort has struck a surface but another unit has located a gap, we shift the focus of effort to the second unit and redirect our combat power in support of it. In this manner we “pull” combat power through gaps from the front rather than “pushing” it through from the rear.¹³ Commanders must rely on the initiative of subordinates to locate the gaps and must have the flexibility to respond quickly to opportunities rather than following predetermined schemes.

 

COMBINED ARMS

In order to maximize combat power, we must use all the available resources to best advantage. To do so, we must follow a doctrine of combined arms. Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that in order to counteract one, the enemy must make himself more vulnerable to another. We pose the enemy not just with a problem, but with a dilemma a no-win situation.

We accomplish combined arms through the tactics and techniques we use at the lower levels and through task organization at higher levels. In so doing, we take advantage of the complementary characteristics of different types of units and enhance our mobility and firepower. We use each arm for missions that no other arm can perform as well; for example, we assign aviation a task that cannot be performed equally well by artillery. An example of the concept of combined arms at the very lowest level is the complementary use of the automatic weapon and grenade launcher within a fire team. We pin an enemy down with the high-volume, direct fire of the automatic weapon, making him a vulnerable target for the grenade launcher. If he moves to escape the impact of the grenades, we engage him with the automatic weapon.

We can expand the example to the MAGTF level: We use assault support to quickly concentrate superior ground forces for a breakthrough. We use artillery and close air support to support the infantry penetration, and we use deep air support to interdict enemy reinforcements. Targets which cannot be effectively suppressed by artillery are engaged by close air support. In order to defend against the infantry attack, the enemy must make himself vulnerable to the supporting arms. If he seeks cover from the supporting arms, our infantry can maneuver against him. In order to block our penetration, the enemy must reinforce quickly with his reserve. But in order to avoid our deep air support, he must stay off the roads, which means he can only move slowly. If he moves slowly, he cannot reinforce in time to prevent our breakthrough. We have put him in a dilemma.

CONCLUSION

We have discussed the aim and characteristics of maneuver warfare. We have discussed the philosophy of command necessary to support this style of warfare. And we have discussed some of the tactics of maneuver warfare. By this time it should be clear that maneuver warfare exists not so much in the specific methods used we eschew formulas - but in the mind of the Marine. In this regard, maneuver warfare like combined arms applies equally to the Marine expeditionary force commander and the fire team leader. It applies regardless of the nature of the conflict, whether amphibious operations or sustained operations ashore, of low or high intensity, against guerrilla or mechanized foe, in desert or jungle.

Maneuver warfare is a way of thinking in and about war that should shape our every action. It is a state of mind born of a bold will, intellect, initiative, and ruthless opportunism. It is a state of mind bent on shattering the enemy morally and physically by paralyzing and confounding him, by avoiding his strength, by quickly and aggressively exploiting his vulnerabilities, and by striking him in the way that will hurt him most. In short, maneuver warfare is a philosophy for generating the greatest decisive effect against the enemy at the least possible cost to ourselves a philosophy for “fighting smart.”

NOTES

The Nature of War

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 119.

2. B.H. Liddell Hart, as quoted in Encyclopedia Britannica, 1929.

3. A.A. Vandegrift, “Battle Doctrine for Front Line Leaders,” (Third Marine Division, 1944) p. 7.

4. For the definitive treatment of the nature and theory of war, see the unfinished classic, On War, by Clausewitz. All Marine officers should consider this book essential reading. Read the Princeton University Press edition, the best English translation available. This version also includes several valuable essays on the book and author and a useful guide to reading On War.

5. In the strict legal sense, the United States enters a state of war only by formal declaration of Congress, which possesses the sole constitutional power to do so. The United States has declared war on five occasions: with Britain (1812); with Mexico (1846); with Spain (1898); with Germany and Austria-Hungary (1917); and with Japan, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania (1941-2). A President, as commander in chief, may commit U.S. Forces to military action without a declaration of war when the circumstances do not warrant or permit time for such a declaration. Militarily there will be little if any distinction between war and military action short of war. Within this context, this book will focus on the military aspects of war, and the term war as discussed here will apply to that state of hostilities between or among nations regardless of the existence of a declaration of war.

6. Clausewitz, On War, p. 121.

7. For a first-hand description of human experience and reaction in war, read Guy Sajer’s The Forgotten Soldier (Annapolis, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co., 1988), a powerful

account of the author’s experience as a German infantryman on the eastern front during the Second World War and ultimately a tribute to the supremacy of the human will.

8. Clausewitz: “Kind-hearted people might, of course, think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. “This is how the matter must be seen. It would be futile even wrong to try to shut one’s eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality.” On War, pp. 75-76.

9. For an insightful study of the reaction of men to combat, see S.L.A. Marshall’s Men Against Fire (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1961).

10. The American Heritage Dictionary, (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1983).

11. In his often-quoted maxim, Napoleon assigned an actual ratio: “In war, the moral is to the material as three to one.”

The Theory Of War

1. Clausewitz, On War, p. 87

2. Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. SeB. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) p. 85. Like On War, The Art of War should be on every Marine officer’s list of essential reading.

Short and simple to read, The Art of War is every bit as valuable today as when it was written about 400 B.C.

3. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1923) vol. II, p. 5. The passage continues: “Nearly all battles which are regarded as masterpiecee of the military art, from which have been derived the foundation of states and the fame of commanders, have been battles of manoeuvre in which the enemy has found himself defeated by some novel expedient or device, some queer, swift, unexpected thrust or stratagem. In many battles the losses of the victors have been small. There is required for the composition of a great commander not only massive common sense and reasoning power, not only imagination, but also an element of legerdemain, an original and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten. It is because military leaders are credited with gifts of this order which enable them to ensure victory and save slaughter that their profession is held in such high honour. “There are many kinds of manoeuvre in war, some only of which take place upon the battlefield. There are manouevres far to the flank or rear. There are manoeuvres in time, in diplomacy, in mechanics, in psychology; all of which are removed from the battlefield, but react often decisively upon it, and the object of all is to find easier ways, other than sheer slaughter, of achieving the main purpose.

4. Clausewitz, On War, p. 87. We prefer the phrase with military force rather than by military force as translated since military force does not replace the other elements of national power, but supplements them.

5. Ibid., pp. 87-88.

6. Clausewitz, On War, p. 77.

7. The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington: The White House, 1988), pp. 7-8. lists the elements of national power as moral and economic example, military strength, economic vitality, alliance relationships, public diplomacy, security assistance, development assistance, science and technology cooperation, international organizations, and diplomatic mediation.

8. Also referred to as grand strategy or the policy level. From JCS Pub. 1-02: “ National Strategy (DOD, IADB) The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.”

9. JCS Pub. 1-02: Military Strategy - (DOD, IADB) The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.”

10. JCS Pub. 1-02: “ Tactical Level of War - (DOD) The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.”

11. JCS Pub. 1-02: “ Operational Level of War - (DOD) The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.”

12. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 84, 357-359.

13. Ibid., p. 357.

14. Clausewitz argued (p. 524) that while the offense is an integral component of the concept of defense, the offense is conceptually complete in itself. The introduction of the defense into the concept of the offense, he argued, is a necessary evil and not an integral component.

15. Clausewitz, On War, p. 528.

16. The United States Army has also adopted a doctrine based on maneuver, called “AirLand Battle.” The principal doctrinal source is Field Manual 1OO-5, Operations (1986).

17. JCS Pub. 1-02: “ Combat Power (DOD, NATO) The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation, can apply against the opponent at a given time.”

18. Clausewitz, On War, p. 194.

19. Ibid., p. 617.

20. Tempo is often associated with a mental process known variously as the “Decision Cycle,” “OODA Loop,” or “Boyd Cycle,” after retired Air Force Colonel John Boyd who pioneered the concept in his lecture, “The Patterns of Conflict.” Boyd identified a four-step mental process: observation, orientation, decision, and action. Boyd theorized that each party to a conflict first observes the situation. On the basis of the observation, he orients; that is, he makes an estimate of the situation. On the basis of the orientation, he makes a decision. And, finally, he implements the decision he acts. Because his action has created a new situation, the process begins anew. Boyd argued that the party that consistently completes the cycle faster gains an advantage that increases with each cycle. His enemy’s reactions become increasingly slower by comparison and therefore less effective until, finally, he is overcome by events.

21. From basic physics, momentum is the product of mass and velocity: M=mv.

22. Clausewitz. On War. p. 198.

23. Edward N. Luttwak. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge. MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987) p. 8.

24. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, pp. 8-10.

25. Clausewitz, On War, p. 190.

26. Ibid.

27. We should note that this concept is meaningless in attrition warfare in its purest form, since the identification of critical vulnerability by definition is based on selectivity, which is a foreign thought to the attrionist. In warfare by attrition, any target is as good as any other as long as it contributes to the cumulative destruction of the enemy.

28. Sometimes known as the center of gravity. However, there is a danger in using this term. Introducing the term into the theory of war, Clausewitz wrote (p. 485): “A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated the most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity.” Clearly, Clausewitz was advocating a climactic test of strength against strength “by daring all to will all” (p. 596). This approach is consistent with Clausewitz’ historical perspective. But we have since come to prefer pitting strength against weakness. Applying the term to modern warfare, we must make it clear that by the enemy’s center of gravity we do not mean a source of strength, but rather a critical vulnerability.

Preparing for War

1. Hans von Seekt, Thoughts of a Soldier, trans. G. Waterhouse (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1930) p. 123.

2. Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, ed. B.H. Liddell Hart, trans. P. Findlay (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1985) p. 226.

3. George S. Patton, Jr., Cavalry Journal, April 1922, p. 167.

4. JCS Pub. 1-02: “ Campaign Plan -(DOD, IADB) A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space.” As defined, a campaign plan pertains to military operations, but the thought applies equally to preparations.

5. JCS Pub. 1-02: “ Doctrine -(DOD, IADB) Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”

6. Field Manual 100-5, T entative Field Service Regulations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939) p. 31.

7. Clausewitz: “In a commander a bold act may prove to be a blunder. Nevertheless it is a laudable error, not to be regarded on the same footing as others. Happy the army where ill-timed boldness occurs frequently; it is a luxuriant weed, but indicates the richness of the soil. Even foolhardiness that is, boldness without object-is not to be despised: basically it stems from daring, which in this case has erupted with a passion unrestrained by thought. Only when boldness rebels against obedience, when it defiantly ignores an expressed command, must it be treated as a dangerous offense; then it must be prevented, not for its innate qualities, but because an order has been disobeyed, and in war obedience is of cardinal importance.” On War, pp. 190-191.

The Conduct of War

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, p. 101.

2. Ibid., p. 134.

3. Sir William Slim, Defeat into Victory (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd, 1956) pp. 550-55].

4. JCS Pub. 1-02: “ Maneuver -(DOD. NATO)... 4. Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.”

5. Boyd introduces the idea of implicit communication as a command tool in his lecture, “An Organic Design for Command and Control.”

6. Hence the terms area of influence and area of interest. JCS Pub. 1 -02: “ Area of Influence - (DOD, NATO) A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations, by maneuver or fire support systems normally under his command or control.” “ Area of Interest - (DOD, NATO, IADB) That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to theeobjectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.”

7. Much of the material in this section is adapted from John F. Schmitt’s article, “Observations on Decisionmaking in Battle,” Marine Corps Gazette, March 1988, pp. 18-20.

8. Napoleon Bonaparte. “Maxims of War,” Napoleon and Modern War; His Military Maxims, annotated C.H.eLanza (Harrisonburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co., 1953) p. 19.

9. George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1979) p. 354.

10. JCS Pub. 1-02: “ Mission Type Order- (DOD, IADB).... 2. Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished.”

11. JCS Pub. 1-02: “ Mission -(DOD, IADB) 1. The task, together with the purpose, which clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor.”

12. The well known Soviet fire-sack defense, for example.

13. Hence the terms reconnaissance pull and command push respectively. See William S. Lind’s Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985) pp. 18-19.