Ballistic Missile Defense Systems

Module 3

Ballistic Missile Defense Systems

UNIT 1

1. Study the infographics and discuss the main components of the ballistic missile defense system. Pay attention to the defense segments.

 

Watch the video “Missile defense countermeasures” and answer the questions:

 

1. Where is the attacking missiles warhead supposed to be released?

2. What could the defense use to detect the incoming warhead?

3. How do the interceptor missiles find the location of the warhead?

4. Give the examples of countermeasures to confuse the defense.

5. Why can`t the defense radars find the warhead among the balloons? Name all the reasons.

6. What can you say about the heat detection?

7. How could bomblets be used?

8. What is the most effective way of using bomblets?

Read the text and answer the questions below.

Match the words or phrases in English 1-26 with their Russian equivalents a-z.

1) incoming missile	a) фаза самообороны
2) surveillance	b) тактики защиты от вторжения
3) reconnaissance	c) эффективная площадь отражения
4) detection and tracking weapons	d) сражение; бой;
5) engagement	e) оружие обнаружения и сопровождения
6) intercept engagement phases	f) воздушное пространство над районом боевых действий, боевое пространство
7) area defense phase	g) снизить вероятность поражения
8) self-defense phase	h) атакующая ракета
9) point defense phase	i) вероятность полного уничтожения
10) defense penetration techniques	j) наблюдение; контроль
11) battlespace	k) фаза боевого перехвата
12) radar cross section	l) разведка; рекогносцировка
13) to counter these offensive techniques.	m) головка самонаведения, самонаводящаяся противоракета
14) to drive down the probability-of-kill	n) фаза обороны района
15) probability-of-raid annihilation	o) фаза защиты объекта
16) engagement opportunity	p) преимущества в сражении
17) jamming	q) обманывать защитные системы
18) missile seeker	r) противодействовать тактикам при наступлении
19) range and angle estimates	s) серия налетов
20) evasive maneuver	t) подлетающая ПТУР
21) to evade defensive weapons	u) время задержки
22) to saturate the defensive systems	v) подавлять защитные системы
23) to confuse the defensive systems	w) подавление (помехами); помехи
24) stream raids	x) оценочные показатели радиуса действия и угла
25) inbound offensive missile	y) маневр уклонения
26) latency time	z) уклоняться от оборонительного оружия

Make up seven sentences with the word combinations in 4.

6. Translate the following sentences from English into Russian:

1) Terrorism has to be fought with knowledge, with surveillance and intelligence.

2) New fighters and bombers could be equipped with cameras to carry out the same reconnaissance with a much better chance of survival.

3) We've got a GPS for tracking, and a black box with a pinger so we can find the rocket no matter where it lands.

4) Meanwhile, preparations for military engagement in the Persian Gulf continue.

5) As part of their primary mission, NATO fighter pilots sit on continuous alert, ready to intercept and identify uninvited aircraft.

6) Naval warfare is combat in and on the sea, the ocean, or any other battlespace involving major body of water such as a large lake or wide river.

7) A stealth corvette of the YS 2000 design has a detection range of 13 km in rough seas and 22 km in calm sea without jamming.

8) This has the advantage that it may help prevent the driver from sliding out of position during violent evasive maneuvers, which could cause loss of control of the vehicle.

9) At high frequency, the user position and velocity estimates of the navigator are fed back to the GPS tracking loops.

Word list

incoming missile - атакующая ракета

surveillance - [sə:ˈveɪləns] наблюдение; контроль

reconnaissance- [rıʹkɒnıs(ə)ns]разведка; рекогносцировка

detection and tracking weapons- оружие обнаружения и сопровождения

engagement- сражение; бой;

intercept engagement phases- фаза боевого перехвата

area defense phase- фаза обороны района

self-defense phase- фаза самообороны

point defense phase- фаза защиты объекта

defense penetration techniques  - тактики защиты от вторжения

battlespace- воздушное пространство над районом боевых действий, боевое пространство

radar cross section- эффективная площадь отражения

to counter these offensive techniques -  противодействовать тактикам при наступлении

to drive down the probability-of-kill- снизить вероятность поражения

probability-of-raid annihilation- [ əˌnaɪəˈleɪʃən] вероятность полного уничтожения

engagement opportunity – преимущества в сражении

jamming - подавление (помехами); помехи

missile seeker - головка самонаведения, самонаводящаяся противоракета

range and angle estimates - оценочные показатели радиуса действия и угла

evasive maneuver - маневр уклонения

to evade defensive weapons - уклоняться от оборонительного оружия

to saturate the defensive system - ˈ[sætʃəreɪt] подавлять системы защиты

to confuse the defensive systems - обманывать защитные системы

stream raids - серия налетов

inbound offensive missile - подлетающая ПТУР

latency time - время задержки

UNIT 2

 

Agile radars

Agile radars like AESA (or PESA) can change their frequency with every pulse (except when using doppler filtering), and generally do so using a random sequence, integrating over time does not help pull the signal out of the background noise. Moreover, a radar may be designed to extend the duration of the pulse and lower its peak power. An AESA or modern PESA will often have the capability to alter these parameters during operation. This makes no difference to the total energy reflected by the target but makes the detection of the pulse by an RWR system less likely. Nor does the AESA have any sort of fixed pulse repetition frequency, which can also be varied and thus hide any periodic brightening across the entire spectrum. Older generation RWRs are essentially useless against AESA radars, which is why AESA's are also known as "low probability of intercept radars". Modern RWRs must be made highly sensitive (small angles and bandwidths for individual antennas, low transmission loss and noise) and add successive pulses through time-frequency processing to achieve useful detection rates.

Methods

Ways of reducing the profile of a radar include using wider bandwidth (wideband, Ultra-wideband), frequency hopping, using FMCW, and using only the minimum power required for the task. Using pulse compression also reduces the probability of detection, since the peak transmitted power is lower while the range and resolution is the same.

Constructing a radar so as to emit minimal side and back lobes may also reduce the probability of interception when it is not pointing at the radar warning receiver. However, when the radar is sweeping a large volume of space for targets, it is likely that the main lobe will repeatedly be pointing at the RWR. Modern phased-array radars not only control their side lobes, they also use very thin, fast-moving beams of energy in complicated search patterns. This technique may be enough to confuse the RWR so it does not recognize the radar as a threat, even if the signal itself is detected.

In addition to stealth considerations, reducing side and back lobes is desirable as it makes the radar more difficult to characterise. This can increase the difficulty in determining which type it is (concealing information about the carrying platform) and make it much harder to jam.

Systems that feature LPIR include modern active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars such as that on the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the passive electronically scanned array (PESA) on the S-300PMU-2 missile.

 

Word list

mismatches in speed - несоответствие в скоростях

directed energy weapon - оружие направленной энергии

energy penalty - увеличенный расход энергии

engagement range - дальность стрельбы

adverse weather conditions - неблагоприятные погодные условия

to reduce the lethality - снизить поражающее действие (убойную силу)

line of sight - зона прямой видимости

shipborne radar - корабельная радиолокационная станция

on elevated terrain - на возвышенной местности

conspicuous - [kənˈspɪkjʊəs] заметный, бросающийся в глаза, видный

another consideration - помимо этого, следует учитывать

obstruction zone - зона помех

cross - section reduction - снижение эффективной пощади отражения

bandwidth - ширина полосы пропускания, ширина спектра (сигнала)

agile radar [ˈædʒaɪl]- радар с быстрой настройкой частоты

AESA (active electronically scanned array) - антенна с активной фазированной решёткой

RWR (radar warning receiver) приемник радиолокационного облучения

side lobe - боковой лепесток направленности антенны

back lobe - задний лепесток диаграммы направленности антенны

UNIT 3

Radar Jamming

Radar jamming and deception is a form of electronic countermeasures that intentionally sends out radio frequency signals to interfere with the operation of radar by saturating its receiver with noise or false information. Concepts that blanket the radar with signals so its display cannot be read are normally known as jamming, while systems that produce confusing or contradictory signals are known as deception, but it is also common for all such systems to be referred to as jamming.

There are two general classes of radar jamming, mechanical and electronic. Mechanical jamming entails reflecting enemy radio signals in various ways to provide false or misleading target signals to the radar operator. Electronic jamming works by transmitting additional radio signals towards enemy receivers, making it difficult to detect real target signals, or take advantage of known behaviors of automated systems like radar lock-on to confuse the system.

Various counter-countermeasures can sometimes help radar operators maintain target detection despite jamming.

1. How do electronic countermeasures work?

2. What are the two classes of radar jamming? How do they differ?

 

Word list

radar jamming - радиолокационная помеха

deception - радиолектронное подавление

radar lock - on -захват радиолокационной станцией

to blanket the radar - заглушать шум, радиопередачу

counter-countermeasures - противодействие преднамеренным радиопомехам,

радиоэлектронная защита

chaff - дипольные отражатели

corner reflector -  угловой отражатель

decoy [̘ˈdi:kɔɪ] - средство отвлечения; ложная цель

Doppler shift - допплеровский сдвиг частоты

to clutter up – перегружать

to deplete – расходовать, сокращать

Electronic Jamming

Electronic jamming is a form of electronic warfare where jammers radiate interfering signals toward an enemy's radar, blocking the receiver with highly concentrated energy signals. The two main technique styles are noise techniques and repeater techniques. The three types of noise jamming are spot, sweep, and barrage.

Spot jamming or spot noise occurs when a jammer focuses all of its power on a single frequency. This overwhelms the reflection of the original radar signal off the targets, the "skin return" or "skin reflection", making it impossible to pick out the target on the radar display. This technique is only useful against radars that broadcast on a single frequency, and can be countered by changing the frequency or other operational parameters like the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) so the jammer is no longer broadcasting on the same frequency or at the right times. While multiple jammers could possibly jam a range of frequencies, this would consume many resources and be of little effect against modern frequency-agile radars that constantly change their broadcasts.

Sweep jamming is a modification of spot jamming where the jammer's full power is shifted from one frequency to another. While this has the advantage of being able to jam multiple frequencies in quick succession, it does not affect them all at the same time, and thus limits the effectiveness of this type of jamming. Although, depending on the error checking in the device(s) this can render a wide range of devices effectively useless.

Barrage jamming is a further modification of sweep jamming in which the jammer changes frequencies so rapidly it appears to be a constant radiator across its entire bandwidth. The advantage is that multiple frequencies can be jammed essentially simultaneously. The first effective barrage jammer was introduced as the carcinotron in the early 1950s, and was so effective it was believed that all long-range radar systems might be rendered useless. However, the jamming effect can be limited because this requires the jammer to spread its full power between these frequencies—the effectiveness against each frequency decreases with the number of frequencies covered. The creation of extremely powerful multi-frequency radars like Blue Riband offset the effectiveness of the carcinotron.

Base jamming is a new type of barrage jamming whereby one radar is jammed effectively at its source at all frequencies. However, all other radars continue working normally.

Pulse jamming produces noise pulses with period depending on radar mast rotation speed thus creating blocked sectors from directions other than the jammer, making it harder to discover the jammer location.

Cover pulse jamming creates a short noise pulse when radar signal is received thus concealing any aircraft flying behind the jammer with a block of noise.

Digital radio frequency memory, or DRFM jamming, or Repeater jamming is a repeater technique that manipulates received radar energy and retransmits it to change the return the radar sees. This technique can change the range the radar detects by changing the delay in transmission of pulses, the velocity the radar detects by changing the Doppler shift of the transmitted signal, or the angle to the plane by using AM techniques to transmit into the sidelobes of the radar. Electronics, radio equipment, and antenna can cause DRFM jamming causing false targets, the signal must be timed after the received radar signal. By analysing received signal strength from side and backlobes and thus getting radar antennae radiation pattern, false targets can be created to directions other than one where the jammer is coming from. If each radar pulse is uniquely coded it is not possible to create targets in directions other than the direction of the jammer.

Inadvertent jamming

In some cases, jamming of either type may be caused by friendly sources. Inadvertent mechanical jamming is fairly common because it is indiscriminate and affects any nearby radars, hostile or not. Electronic jamming can also be inadvertently caused by friendly sources, usually powerful EW platforms operating within range of the affected radar.

 

UNIT 4

 

Sensing Mechanisms

Word list

illuminate направлять луч, волну

discrimination - различение; установление различия;

legitimate [lıʹdʒıtımeıt] - законный

kill assessment - определение степени поражения (цели)

BMD (ballistic missile defense) - воен. противоракетная оборона,

spectral response - спектральная чувствительность

RV (reentry vehicl e) - головная часть, ГЧ (ракеты); боеголовка;

3. Read the text and answer the questions below:

Sensors

When an electromagnetic source, such as radio or radar, is used to guide the missile, an antenna and receiver are installed in the missile to form what is known as a SENSOR. The sensor section picks up, or senses, the guidance instructions. Missiles that are guided by other means use different sensor elements. But the missile control sections, which follow the sensor section, are basically similar for all types of guidance. In some respects, the sensor unit is the most important section of the guidance system because it detects the form of energy being used to guide the missile. If the sensor unit fails, there can be no guidance.

The kind of sensor that is used will be determined by such factors as maximum operating range, operating conditions, the kind of information needed, the accuracy required, viewing angle and weight and size of the sensor, and the type of target and its speed.

Acoustic sensors called hydrophones are often used in torpedo guidance systems. Essentially, a hydrophone is a microphone that works underwater. It picks up the vibrations of ships' propellers, and the torpedo can "home" on this noise. Acoustic sensors are not well suited for airborne missiles.

Heat, or infrared sensors use an active element called a THERMOCOUPLE, or an element known as a BOLOMETER. Either sensor may be used with a lens and reflector system.

Sensors that respond to light use an active element called a PHOTOELECTRIC cell. Another light-sensing system uses a television camera to pick up information and send it back to the launching site by means of a TV transmitter in the missile.

Electromagnetic sensors use radio or radar antennas as active elements. The phase of guidance determines the location of the antenna in the missile structure. For initial and midcourse guidance the antenna is normally streamlined into the tail of the missile. For final phase guidance the sensor may be located in the nose of the missile.

All of these sensors have advantages and disadvantages. Some are well suited for final phase applications and totally unsuited for initial and midcourse guidance.

1. What is the most important part of a guidance system?

2. Can acoustic sensors be used for airborne missiles?

3. Can a TV camera be used as a part of a sensing system?

4. Where is a sensor installed in a missile structure?

 

4. Look through the text and answer the questions below:

The Sky Spotter

Electro-optical sensors are the most important component of ballistic missile defense. The term "electro-optical sensor" covers a wide range of sensor technologies and applications. At their root, electro-optical (E/O) sensors are electronic detectors that convert light, or a change in light, into an electronic signal, which is analyzed to trigger preset responses. The capability of any E/O sensor stems from the balancing of two fundamental limits: the combination of resolution and sensitivity, and pixilation. Resolution means how small an object can be usefully seen. Sensitivity means how dim the signal can be before it is overwhelmed by environmental noise. Pixelation refers to sampling of the sensor image.

Advances to E/O sensors have the potential to improve response time for multi-source information fusion, survivability, and reliability in missile defense applications.

The Sky Spotter is an advanced passive early warning electro optical (EO) system sensor for real-time airspace monitoring, early detection and accurate tracking of aerial objects, including drones, aircraft, etc. It features advanced algorithms for automation, image processing and artificial intelligence.

The Sky Spotter’s detection sensors are reinforced with multispectral investigation sensors which are pointed at the target by early detection. Operators can manage up to 4 sensors simultaneously, each with two channels. Originally developed to counter small drones, Sky Spotter can track aircraft and pinpoint their location. The Sky Spotter provides passive sensing, detection, tracking and identification of aerial targets. It remains unaffected by classic radar challenges: multipath, clutter, background. It enables multiple targets to engage, track and manage multiple targets simultaneously.

While airspace surveillance in both civil and military worlds relies almost totally on radar, advances in threat technology have rendered legacy radars less dependable than they once were. Jamming and defense suppression attacks can disrupt or deny large areas of coverage, while low-RCS (radar cross section) targets and those flying low and slow are increasingly difficult to detect.

To address these issues Rafael has developed a passive, unjammable airspace surveillance electro-optical system that uses medium- and short-wave infrared sensors alongside visible light sensors to provide complete coverage over a designated area, ranging from a radius of one kilometer out to many tens of kilometers. The employment of highly sensitive EO sensors removes the complications of radar surveillance, such as background clutter, multipath anomalies, and the inability to spot targets such as small drones.

Sky Spotter comprises a wide field-of-view staring sensor which maintains constant watch, its imagery being processed to automatically provide a sense-and-warn function and to lock-and-track multiple targets simultaneously. The number of staring sensors can be scaled to ensure full coverage in a networked environment.

When a suspect object is automatically detected by these sensors the system cues an investigating sensor with a much narrower field of view. Imagery from this sensor can be used for investigation purposes to determine what the target is, and can theoretically eliminate the need to needlessly send manned interceptors to investigate blips on a radar screen that often turn out to be harmless.

1. How do electro-optical sensors work?

2. How have the Sky Spotter’s detection sensors been improved?

3. Have there been any new developments in the Rafael electro-optical system?

4. What are the Sky Spotter sensors?

UNIT 5

Russian Defense Systems

Pantsir at a Glance

Originated from: Russia
Possessed by: Algeria, Brazil, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Syria, UAE, Vietnam
Alternate Names: Pantsyr, SA-22 Greyhound, “Carapace” (Russian translation)
Class: Surface-to-Air (SAM)
Basing: Mobile, ground-based
Warhead: 20 kg high-explosive fragmentation (57E6 missile)
Range: 20 km (Pantsir-S1), 30 km (Pantsir-S1M), 40 km (Pantsir-SM)
Status: Operational
In service: 2003-Present

Development

Russia’s KBP Instrument Design Bureau began development of the Pantsir in 1989 as a replacement for the 2K22 Tunguska air defense system. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, requirements for the system changed. Instead of providing defense for airfields, missile silos, command centers, and communication arrays, the Pantsir was redefined as a short-range defense for Russian ground forces and longer-range air defense systems like the S-300, S-400, and S-500. The finalized Pantsir design entered service in 2003.

Description

The Pantsir air defense system incorporates anti-aircraft guns and missiles to intercept tactical aircraft, precision-guided munitions, and small unmanned aerial vehicles. Using its solid-state search radar, the Pantsir can track up to 20 tactical aircraft-sized targets at a range of 32 – 36 km. After detection, the system can select targets with its high-frequency engagement radar or optional thermal imaging sensor. Although each Pantsir launch vehicle is capable of functioning independently, they typically operate in batteries of six launcher vehicles and are occasionally accompanied by a separate command and control vehicle.

The baseline Pantsir system is equipped with up to twelve 57E6 missiles and two 30mm 2A38M cannons, allowing it to engage up to four targets simultaneously. The 57E6 is a two-stage missile with radio-command guidance and 20 kg blast-fragmentation warhead. A variant of the 57E6, the 9M335, features a continuous-rod fragmentation warhead. Both missile variants are 3.3 m long, 170 mm in diameter, and weigh 75.7 kg at launch.

Using 57E6 missiles, the Pantsir-S1 can engage tactical aircraft at a maximum range of 20 km and altitude of 10 km, subsonic cruise missiles at a range of 12 km and altitude of 6 km, and high-speed air-to-ground missiles at a range of 7 km and altitude of 6 km. At targets perpendicular to the system’s orientation, missile engagement ranges are halved. The 57E6 also possesses a minimum engagement range of 1.5km. Using its guns, the Pantsir-S1 can engage airborne targets at 4 km at a maximum altitude of 3km. Each gun can fire up to 40 rounds per second and possess a secondary capability to attack ground targets.

In 2020, Pantsir’s chief designer disclosed the existence of two new Pantsir-compatible missiles. The first—with a smaller fragmentation warhead and top speed of Mach 5—has reportedly entered Russian service. The second missile remains under development and is estimated to enter production between 2023 and 2024. Designed to defeat small unmanned aerial vehicles, the missile will possess a maxium range of 5 – 7 km and a reduced size, allowing for up to 48 to be fitted on a Pantsir turret.

Several upgraded Pantsir variants are in development. The Pantsir-SM, announced in 2016, will supposedly feature a detection range of up to 75 km and an engagement range of 40 km. Russia first tested the Pantsir-SM in early 2019. An export variant of the Pantsir-SM, the Pantsir-S1M, incorporates a new missile and features an engagement range of 30 km.

Service History

Since 2013, Russia has deployed Pantsir S-1 to Syria amid the country’s civil war to defend its soldiers and Syrian government forces.

The Pantsir has also played a role in the Russian/Ukrainian conflict. Notably, pieces from a Pantsir 57E6 missile were found in Ukraine in November 2014, and in December, it was confirmed that Russia had deployed the air defense system to the Russia-Ukraine border region. In February 2015, reports and footage of Pantsirs being used by pro-Russian forces in Ukraine’s Donetsk region surfaced. The system has also been deployed in the Luhansk region in eastern Ukraine.

 

1. What were the initial requirements for the Pantsir system?
2. Why were they changed?
3. Were there any alterations in the missile purposes?
4. What helps the system to choose the targets?
5. Does the Pantsir system always work independently?
6. Can this missile hit ten targets at the same time?
7. How does the 57E6 variant of the missile differ from the former one?
8. When can the missile engagement ranges be reduced?
9. Can the Pantsir system attack ground targets using its guns?
10. Describe the main features of two new missiles that could be used together with the Pantsir system.

 

S-200 at a Glance

Originated from: Soviet Union
Possessed by: Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Libya (?), Myanmar, North Korea, Poland, Russia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Ukraine
Alternate Names: SA-5 Gammon (NATO Designation)
Class: Surface-to-Air missile (SAM)
Basing: Static, ground-launched
Length: 10.7 m
Diameter: 0.86 m
Launch Weight: approx. 7,000 kg
Payload: 217 kg or 25 KT
Warhead: High-explosive fragmentation, nuclear capable
Propulsion: Single stage liquid motor, 4 wraparound jettisonable solid propellant boosters
Range: 60-300 km
Status: Operational
In Service: 1967

S-200 Development

Soviet engineers began to develop the S-200 surface-to-air missile system during the 1950s, primarily to counter the U.S. B-58 supersonic bomber, U2 spy plane, and other reconnaissance aircraft.

Since its initial deployment in 1966, the S-200 received multiple upgrades to increase the system’s range and accuracy. In 1967, the original S-200 A “Angara” fired the 5V21 missile, which incorporated relatively advanced technology for the era, such as a continuous wave (CW) semi-active homing seeker radar for terminal guidance. The S-200V “Vega,” S-200M “Vega M”, and S-200VE “Vega Export” were introduced between 1970 and 1972. These systems fired the 5V28 missile to distances of 200-250 km. The S-200VE is identical to the S-200V, but was sold with a high explosive warhead, and is not nuclear capable. Operational by 1975, the S-200D “Dubna” is a nuclear capable system that fired an improved 5V28V rocket with a range of 300 km.

At its peak in 1985, the S-200V was deployed at over 130 launch sites throughout the Soviet Union, comprising of 338 batteries, or about 2030 launchers.

S-200 Specifications

Variant

Missile

Length

Diameter

Booster Length

Booster Diameter Range Payload Angara (A) 5V21 10.5 m

0.86 m

4.9 m 0.48 m 150-180 km HE-Frag Vega (V) 5V28 10.7 m

0.86 m

4.9 m 0.48 m 200 km HE-Frag Vega M (VM) 5V28 10.7 m

0.86 m

4.9 m 0.48 m 200-250 km HE-Frag, Nuclear Vega E (VE) 5V28 10.7 m

0.86 m

4.9 m 0.48 m 200-250 km HE-Frag Dubna (D) 5V28V 10.7 m

0.86 m

4.9 m 0.48 m 300 km HE-Frag, Nuclear                  

Ang ara
The original S-200 Angara fired the 5V21 missile. The 5V21 is 10.5 m in length and 0.86 m in diameter, with a range of 150 km. At launch, the 5V21 weighs roughly 7,000 kg, and is propelled by 4 jettisonable solid propellant rocket boosters and a single stage liquid motor. The system uses semi-active radar to direct the 217 kg HE fragmentation warhead to its target.

Vega, Vega M, Vega E
The later S-200V, S-200M, and S-200VE use the 5V28 missile. The missile measures 10.7 m in length, 0.86 m diameter, and has a range of 200 km. The 5V28 is a dual-capable missile, using either a proximity fused conventional 217 kg HE warhead or a command detonated 25 KT yield nuclear warhead.

Dubna
The S-200D fires the 5V28V missile. The 5V28V is similar in size to the 5V28, but features enhanced maneuverability, improved radar guidance, and a maximum range of 300 km. The S-200s is typically deployed in six-launcher batteries that require numerous radar and mechanical systems: one 5N69 D-band 500 km radar, one P-35M E/F-band 320 km range target search and acquisition radar, one Square Pair H-band 5N62 270 km missile guidance radar, six trainable semi-fixed single rail 5P72 launchers, and several pre-launch preparation cabins and diesel-powered electricity generator stations. The Square Pair radar is responsible for target tracking and missile guidance during the inflight stage, before the interceptor’s terminal radar seeker is activated.

1. What altitudes could this surface-to-air system be used for?

2. Can it be used only by Russia?

3. What was the main reason to start developing the S-200 system?

4. It had a lot of improvements, didn`t it?

5. What was the advanced technology used by the original S-20 A?

6. What are the advantages of the S-200 “Dubna”?

7. What kind of rocket boosters does the original S-200 “Angara” have?

8. If they are jettisonable, what happens with them?

9. Why is the 5V28 missile called a dual-capable missile?

10. Name the improved characteristics of the SW-200D(“Dubna”).

11. What is the Square Pair radar responsible for?

S-400 at a Glance

Originated from: Russia
Possessed by: Russia
Class: Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM)
Basing: Mobile, ground-based
Warhead: 143 kg high-explosive fragmentation (48N6), hit-to-kill (77N6)
Range: 250-400 km, 60 km (ABM)
Status: Operational
In Service: 2007-Present

Specifications

The S-400 primarily uses the 48N6 missile series. These missiles allow it to hit aerial targets at ranges up to 250 km and are capable of intercepting ballistic missiles across a 60 km radius, using in both cases a 143 kg high explosive fragmentation warhead.

Another missile series, the 77N6, is currently in testing. Unlike other Russian SAMs, the 77N6 missiles will use hit-to-kill technology (as do PAC-3 missiles) and are designed specifically to destroy ballistic missile warheads.

The final missile series used by the S-400 is the 40N6, a long-range family that can extend the air defense capabilities of the system to 400 km. The current deployment status of the 40N6 missile is unclear, and questions remain as to whether the S-400’s radar capabilities would allow the 40N6 make full use of its maximum range.

 

Tor (SA-15 Gauntlet)

The 9K330 Tor (NATO: SA-15 Gauntlet) is a Russian mobile surface-to-air missile system with an engagement range of 12 to 16 kilometers.

Tor at a Glance

Originated from: Russia
Possessed by: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Russia
Alternate Names: SA-15 Gauntlet, Thor, Thorus, Bublik [“Bagel”] (Russian unofficial)
Class: Short-range Air Defense (SHORAD)
Basing: Mobile, ground-based
Warhead: 15 kg high-explosive fragmentation (9M331)
Range: 12-16 km
Status: Operational
In service: 1986-Present

Description

The Tor air defense system incorporates a surveillance antenna, tracking radar, and 9M330/9M331 missiles on a tracked chassis. The vehicle’s maximum speed is 65 km/h and the system is capable of scanning for targets while moving; later variants possess a limited capacity to fire while moving.

Tor uses two radars to detect and engage manned aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, missiles, and other precision-guided munitions. The first, a mechanically-scanned surveillance radar, can scan up to 48 targets and serves a secondary tracking function for up to ten targets. The surveillance radar’s detection range is reportedly 25 km or greater. The second, an electronically-steered tracking radar, can simultaneously engage up to two targets with radar cross sections (RCS) as small as 0.1m². Cruise missiles typically possess RCSs of 0.5m² or smaller. Operating in the K-band, the radar is highly resistant to adverse weather conditions and electronic countermeasures. The radar has a maximum range of over 25km; it is complemented by an electrooptical tracking system with a range of 20 km.

A baseline Tor unit houses up to eight missiles in its vertical-launch system. Produced by the Fakel Design Bureau, Tor-M1’s 9M330 and 9M331 missiles have a launch weight of 165kg and can reach a maximum speed of over Mach 2. Armed with the 9M331 missile, the Tor-M1 has a maximum engagement altitude of 6 km and a maximum engagement range of 15 km.

Tor M1                            Tor M2                           Tor M2DT Test Firing

 

Variants

Tor-M1 Family

The Tor-M1 possesses a significantly different configuration to the original Tor design, with late-production models possessing an electronically-scanned surveillance radar. Since 2005, Russia has exhibited five updates of the Tor-M1: the M1A, M1B, M1V, M1G, and M1-2U. Each successive update incorporates the features in the previous version; the M1A includes a software update to improve range against certain flight patterns, the M1B adds a cooperative engagement capability, the M1V increases the engagement envelope, adds jamming resistance, and further integrates their radar systems, and the M1G replaces the Tor-M1’s electrooptical system with a new day/night camera. The M1-2U is the latest M1-family variant in Russian service, featuring an expanded engagement altitude of 10 km, reduced crew size of three, and ability to engage four targets simultaneously.

Tor-M2 Family

First displayed in 2007, the Tor-M2 family can be armed with up to 8 9M331 or 16 9M338-series missiles, expanding its engagement range to 16 km and ceiling to 10 km against targets under Mach 3. In addition, the Tor-M2 features a reduced crew size of three, improved detection radars sensitive to low-RCS targets, shorter reaction time, new optical and thermal detection systems, enhanced signal processing, and other improvements. These upgrades allow the Tor-M2 family to detect targets at 32 km and engage up to four targets simultaneously. The Tor-M2E is the export designation of the Tor-M2, while the Tor-M2K is a version mounted on a wheeled chassis. The Tor-M2KM, meanwhile, is a self-contained modular variant of the Tor-M2 mountable on various platforms. Another enhanced variant, the Tor-M2U, features upgraded missiles capable of engaging agile targets maneuvering up to 10g. The Tor-M2 system entered Russian service in 2012.

Tor-E2

In 2019, Russia’s Almaz-Antey Concern unveiled the Tor-E2, a “new generation” family of the Tor system capable of detecting targets at 32 km and engaging four simultaneously. Armed with 16 9M338KE missiles, the system features an expanded engagement range and altitude of 16 and 12 km.

Naval and Arctic Variants

Russia operates a navalized version of the Tor, the 3K95 Kinzhal (NATO: SA-N-9 Gauntlet) on several surface ships. In addition, Russia introduced in 2018 the Tor-M2DT, a version of the Tor-M2 built a DT-30 articulated tracked chassis. Optimized for arctic and harsh terrains, the Tor-M2DT entered Russian service in 2019.

 

                                                                   UNIT 6                   

American Defense System

MIM-104 Patriot

The MIM-104 Patriot is a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, the primary of its kind used by the United States Army and several allied nations. It is manufactured by the U.S. defense contractor Raytheon and derives its name from the radar component of the weapon system. The AN/MPQ-53 at the heart of the system is known as the "Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target" which is a backronym for PATRIOT. The Patriot System replaced the Nike Hercules system as the U.S. Army's primary High to Medium Air Defense (HIMAD) system, and replaced the MIM-23 Hawk system as the U.S. Army's medium tactical air defense system. In addition to these roles, Patriot has been given the function of the U.S. Army's anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, which is now Patriot's primary mission. The system is expected to stay fielded until at least 2040.

Patriot equipment

The Patriot system has four major operational functions: communications, command and control, radar surveillance, and missile guidance. The four functions combine to provide a coordinated, secure, integrated, mobile air defense system.

The Patriot system is modular and highly mobile. A battery-sized element can be installed in less than an hour. All components, consisting of the fire control section (radar set, engagement control station, antenna mast group, electric power plant) and launchers, are a truck- or trailer-mounted. The radar set and launchers (with missiles) are mounted on M860 semi-trailers, which are towed by Oshkosh M983 HEMTTs.

Missile reloading is accomplished using a M985 HEMTT truck with a Hiab crane on the back. This crane is larger than the standard Grove cranes found on regular M977 HEMTT and M985 HEMTT cargo body trucks. The truck/crane, called a Guided Missile Transporter (GMT), removes spent missile canisters from the launcher and then replaces them with fresh missiles. Because the crane nearly doubles the height of the HEMTT when not stowed, crews informally refer to it as the "scorpion tail." A standard M977 HEMTT with a regular-sized crane is sometimes referred to as the Large Repair Parts Transporter (LRPT).

The heart of the Patriot battery is the fire control section, consisting of the AN/MPQ-53 or −65 Radar Set, the AN/MSQ-104 Engagement Control Station (ECS), the OE-349 Antenna Mast Group (AMG), and the EPP-III Electric Power Plant. The system's missiles are transported on and launched from the M901 Launching Station, which can carry up to four PAC-2 missiles or up to sixteen PAC-3 missiles. A Patriot battalion is also equipped with the Information Coordination Central (ICC), a command station designed to coordinate the launches of a battalion and uplink Patriot to the JTIDS or MIDS network.

MIM-104B (PAC-1)

Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-1), known today as the PAC-1 upgrade, was a software-only upgrade. The most significant aspects of this upgrade were changing the way the radar searched and the way the system defended its assets. Instead of searching low to the horizon, the top of the radar's search angle was lifted to near vertical (89 degrees) from the previous angle of 25 degrees. This was done as a counter to the steep parabolic trajectory of inbound ballistic missiles. The search beams of the radar were tightened, and while in "TBM search mode" the "flash", or the speed at which these beams were shot out, was increased significantly. While this increased the radar's detection capability against the ballistic missile threat set, it decreased the system's effectiveness against traditional atmospheric targets, as it reduced the detection range of the radar as well as the number of "flashes" at the horizon. Because of this, it was necessary to retain the search functions for traditional atmospheric threats in a separate search program, which could be easily toggled by the operator based on the expected threat. Additionally, the ballistic missile defense capability changed the way Patriot defended targets. Instead of being used as a system to defend a significant area against enemy air attack, it was now used to defend much smaller "point" targets, which needed to lie within the system's TBM "footprint". The footprint is the area on the ground that Patriot can defend against inbound ballistic missiles.

 

MIM-104C (PAC-2)

During the late 1980s, tests began to indicate that, although Patriot was certainly capable of intercepting inbound ballistic missiles, it was questionable whether or not the MIM-104A/B missile was capable of destroying them reliably. This necessitated the introduction of the PAC-2 missile and system upgrade.

For the system, the PAC-2 upgrade was similar to the PAC-1 upgrade. Radar search algorithms were further optimized, and the beam protocol while in "TBM search" was further modified. PAC-2 also saw Patriot's first major missile upgrade, with the introduction of the MIM-104C, or PAC-2 missile. This missile was optimized for ballistic missile engagements. Major changes to the PAC-2 missile were the size of the projectiles in its blast-fragmentation warhead (changed from around 2 grams to around 45 grams), and the timing of the pulse-Doppler radar fuse, which was optimized for high-speed engagements (though it retained its old algorithm for aircraft engagements if necessary). Engagement procedures were also optimized, changing the method of fire the system used to engage ballistic missiles. Instead of launching two missiles in an almost simultaneous salvo, a brief delay (between 3 and 4 seconds) was added in order to allow the second missile launched to discriminate a ballistic missile warhead in the aftermath of the explosion of the first.

MIM-104D (PAC-2/GEM)

There were many more upgrades to PAC-2 systems throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century, again mostly centering on software. However, the PAC-2 missiles were modified significantly—four separate variants became known collectively as guidance enhanced missiles (GEM).

The main upgrade to the original GEM missile was a new, faster proximity fused warhead. Tests had indicated that the fuse on the original PAC-2 missiles were detonating their warheads too late when engaging ballistic missiles with an extremely steep ingress, and as such it was necessary to shorten this fuse delay. The GEM missile was also given a new "low noise" seeker head designed to reduce interference in front of the missile's radar seeker, and a higher performance seeker designed to better detect low radar cross-section targets. The GEM was used extensively in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), during which air defense was highly successful.

Just prior to OIF, it was decided to further upgrade the GEM and PAC-2 missiles. This upgrade program produced missiles known as the GEM/T and the GEM/C, the "T" designator referring to "TBM", and the "C" designator referring to cruise missiles. These missiles were both given a totally new nose section, which was designed specifically to be more effective against low altitude, low RCS targets like cruise missiles. Additionally, the GEM/T was given a new fuse which was further optimized against ballistic missiles. The GEM/C is the upgraded version of the GEM, and the GEM/T is the upgraded version of the PAC-2. The GEM+ entered service in 2002, and the US Army is currently upgrading its PAC-2 and GEM missiles to the GEM/C or GEM/T standard.

MIM-104F (PAC-3)

The PAC-3 upgrade is a significant upgrade to nearly every aspect of the system. It took place in three stages deployed in 1995, 1996 and 2000, and units were designated Configuration 1, 2, or 3.

The system itself saw another upgrade of its WCC and its software, and the communication setup was given a complete overhaul. Due to this upgrade, PAC-3 operators can now see, transmit, and receive tracks on the Link 16 Command and Control (C2) network using a Class 2M Terminal or MIDS LVT Radio. This capability greatly increases the situational awareness of Patriot crews and other participants on the Link 16 network that are able to receive the Patriot local air picture. The software can now conduct a tailored TBM search, optimizing radar resources for search in a particular sector known to have ballistic missile activity, and can also support a "keepout altitude" to ensure ballistic missiles with chemical warheads or early release submunitions (ERS) are destroyed at a certain altitude. For Configuration 3 units, the Patriot radar was completely redesigned, adding another travelling wave tube (TWT) that increased the radar's search, detection, tracking, and discrimination abilities. The PAC-3 radar is capable, among other things, of discriminating whether or not an aircraft is manned and which of multiple reentering ballistic objects are carrying ordnance.

The PAC-3 upgrade carried with it a new missile design, nominally known as MIM-104F and called PAC-3 by the Army. The PAC-3 missile evolved from the Strategic Defense Initiative's ERINT missile, and so it is dedicated almost entirely to the anti-ballistic missile mission. Due to miniaturization, a single canister can hold four PAC-3 missiles (as opposed to one PAC-2 missile per canister). The PAC-3 missile is also more maneuverable than previous variants, due to 180 tiny pulse solid propellant rocket motors mounted in the forebody of the missile (called Attitude Control Motors, or ACMs) which serve to fine align the missile trajectory with its target to achieve hit-to-kill capability. However, the most significant upgrade to the PAC-3 missile is the addition of a K_a band active radar seeker. This allows the missile to drop its uplink to the system and acquire its target itself in the terminal phase of its intercept, which improves the reaction time of the missile against a fast-moving ballistic missile target. The PAC-3 missile is accurate enough to select, target, and home in on the warhead portion of an inbound ballistic missile. The active radar also gives the warhead a "hit-to-kill" (kinetic kill vehicle) capability that completely eliminates the need for a traditional proximity-fused warhead. However, the missile still has a small explosive warhead, called Lethality Enhancer, a warhead which launches 24 low-speed tungsten fragments in radial direction to make the missile cross-section greater and enhance the kill probability. This greatly increases the lethality against ballistic missiles of all types.

The PAC-3 upgrade has effectively quintupled the "footprint" that a Patriot unit can defend against ballistic missiles of all types, and has considerably increased the system's lethality and effectiveness against ballistic missiles. It has also increased the scope of ballistic missiles that Patriot can engage, which now includes several intermediate range. However, despite its increases in ballistic missile defense capabilities, the PAC-3 missile is a less capable interceptor of atmospheric aircraft and air-to-surface missiles. It is slower, has a shorter range, and has a smaller explosive warhead compared to older Patriot missiles.

Patriot's PAC-3 interceptor is the primary interceptor for the new MEADS system, which was scheduled to enter service alongside Patriot in 2014. On November 29, 2012, the MEADS detected, tracked, intercepted and destroyed an air-breathing target in its first-ever intercept flight test at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. ^[26]

Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control is the prime contractor on the PAC-3 Missile Segment upgrade to the Patriot air defense system which will make the missile more agile and extend its range by up to 50%. The PAC-3 Missile Segment upgrade consists of the PAC-3 missile, a very agile hit-to-kill interceptor, the PAC-3 missile canisters (in four packs), a fire solution computer, and an Enhanced Launcher Electronics System (ELES). The PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptor increases altitude and range through a more powerful dual-pulse motor for added thrust, larger fins that collapse inside current launchers, and other structural modifications for more agility.

Future

Patriot upgrades continue, with the most recent being new software known as PDB-7.x (PDB standing for "Post Deployment Build"). This software will allow Configuration 3 units to discriminate targets of all types, to include anti-radiation missile carriers, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles.

The PAC-3 missile is currently being upgraded through the Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE). The MSE upgrade includes a new fin design and a more powerful rocket engine.

Lockheed Martin has proposed an air-launched variant of the PAC-3 missile for use on the F-15C Eagle. Other aircraft, such as the F-22 Raptor and the P-8A Poseidon, have also been proposed.

In the long term, it is expected that existing Patriot batteries will be gradually upgraded with MEADS technology. Because of economic conditions, the U.S. chose to upgrade its Patriot missiles instead of buying the MEADS system. The Royal Netherlands Air Force decided to upgrade its existing systems to the latest standard extending operational use until 2040.

Raytheon has developed the Patriot guidance enhanced missile (GEM-T), an upgrade to the PAC-2 missile. The upgrade involves a new fuse and the insertion of a new low noise oscillator which increases the seeker's sensitivity to low radar cross-section targets. In April 2013, Raytheon received U.S. Army approval for a second recertification, extending the operational life of the worldwide inventory of Patriot missiles from 30 to 45 years.

4. Watch the video: PAC-3 Missile: How the System Works. Answer the questions below:

1) What units does the Patriot system consist of?

2) Give specifications of the PAC-3 missile.

3) What are the attitude control motors used for?

4) What does the radar do when the targets are detected?

5) Why does the operator always maintain override capability?

6) What helps the PAC-3 missile to achieve hit-to-kill intercept?

7) What happens with the remaining PAC-3 missiles when the target has been defeated?

 

UNIT 7

Round-table discussion:

Divide into groups. Choose the topic in Unit 6 and Unit 7

• Prepare short presentations paying attention to the specific features
• Present your group’s ideas to the rest of the class

INFOGRAPHIC 2

 

 

INFOGRAPHIC 3

 

 

Module 3

Ballistic Missile Defense Systems

UNIT 1

1. Study the infographics and discuss the main components of the ballistic missile defense system. Pay attention to the defense segments.