Chapter 2. The theory of war

“The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purposes. ”¹

—Carl von Clausewitz

 “Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of victory in the attack. One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant.” ²

—Sun Tzu

“Battles are won by slaughter and manoeuvre. The greater the general, the more he contributes in manoeuvre, the less he demands in slaughter.” ³

—Winston Churchill

Having arrived at a common view of the nature of war, we proceed to develop from it a theory of War. Our theory of war will in turn be the foundation for the way we prepare for and wage war.

WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

War does not exist for its own sake. It is an extension of policy with military force.⁴ The policy aim that is the motive for war must also be the foremost determinant for the conduct of war. The single most important thought to understand about our theory is that war must serve policy. As the policy aims of war may vary from resistance against aggression to complete annihilation of the enemy, so must the application of violence vary in accordance with those aims. Of course, we may also have to adjust our policy objectives to accommodate our means; we must not establish goals outside our capabilities.

When the policy motive of war is intense, such as the annihilation of an enemy, then policy and war’s natural military tendency toward destruction will coincide, and the war will appear more military and less political in nature. On the other hand, the less intense the policy motive, the more the military tendency toward destruction will be at variance with that motive, and the more political and less military the war will appear. ⁵

The aim in war is to achieve our will. The immediate requirement is to overcome our enemy’s ability to resist us, which is a product of the physical means at his disposal and the strength of his will.⁶ We must either eliminate his physical ability to resist or, short of this, we must destroy his will to resist. In military terms, this means the defeat of the enemy’s fighting forces, but always in a manner and to a degree consistent with the national policy objective.

MEANS IN WAR

At the national level, war involves the use of all the elements of national power, including diplomacy, military force, economics, ideology, technology, and culture.⁷ Our primary concern is with the use of military force as an instrument of policy. But while we will focus on the use of military force, we must not consider it in isolation from the other elements of national power. The use of military force may take any number of forms, from intense warfare with sophisticated weaponry to mere demonstrations. The principal means for the application of military force is combat violence in the form of armed conflict between military or paramilitary forces.

THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Conflict can take a wide range of forms, constituting a spectrum which reflects the magnitude of violence involved. At one end are those conflicts of low intensity in which the application of military power is restrained and selective. The other end of the spectrum represents conflicts of high intensity, such as nuclear war. The place on the spectrum of a specific conflict depends on several factors. Among them are policy objectives, military means available, national will, and density of fighting forces or combat power on the battlefield. In general, the greater the density, the more intense the conflict. As a result, we may witness relatively intense actions within a low-intensity conflict or relatively quiet sectors or phases in an intense war.

Low-intensity conflicts are more probable than high-intensity conflicts. Many nations simply do not possess the military means to wage war at the high end of the spectrum. And, unless national survival is at stake, nations are generally unwilling to accept the risks associated with wars of high intensity. However, a conflict’s intensity may change over time. Belligerents may escalate the level of violence if the original means do not achieve the desired results. Similarly, wars may actually de-escalate over time; for example, after an initial pulse of intense violence, the belligerents may continue to fight on a lesser level, unable to sustain the initial level of intensity.

The Marine Corps, as the nation’s force in readiness, must have the versatility and flexibility to deal with military and paramilitary situations across the entire spectrum of conflict. This is a greater challenge than it may appear; conflicts of low intensity are not simply lesser forms of high-intensity war. A modern military force capable of waging a war of high intensity may find itself ill-prepared for a “small” war against a poorly equipped guerrilla force.

LEVELS OF WAR

War takes place simultaneously at several correlated levels, each with differing ends, means, characteristics, and requirements.

Activities at the strategic level focus directly on national policy objectives. Strategy applies to peace as well as war. Within strategy we distinguish between national strategy, which coordinates and focuses all the components of national power to attain the policy objective,⁸ and military strategy, which is the application of military force to secure the policy objective.⁹ Military strategy thus is subordinate to national strategy. Strategy can be thought of as the art of winning wars. Strategy establishes goals in theaters of war. It assigns forces, provides assets, and imposes conditions on the use of force. Strategy derived from national policy must be clearly understood to be the sole authoritative basis of all operations.

Activities at the tactical level of war focus on the application of combat power to defeat an enemy in combat at a particular time and place.¹⁰ Tactics can be thought of as the art and science of winning engagements and battles. It includes the use of firepower and maneuver, the integration of different arms, and the immediate exploitation of success to defeat the enemy. Included within the tactical level of war is the sustainment of forces during combat. The tactical level also includes the technical application of combat power, which consists of those techniques and procedures for accomplishing specific tasks within a tactical action. These techniques and procedures deal primarily with actions designed to enhance the effects of fires or reduce the effects of enemy fires methods such as the call for fire, techniques of fire, the technical operation of weapons and equipment, or tactical movement techniques. There is a certain overlap between tactics and techniques. We make the point only to draw the distinction between tactics, which are the product of judgment and creativity, and techniques and procedures, which are generally performed by repetitive routine.

The operational level of war links the strategic and tactical levels. It is the use of tactical results to attain s trategic objectives.¹¹ The operational level includes deciding when, where, and under what conditions to engage the enemy in battle—and when, where, and under what conditions to refuse battle with reference to higher aims. Actions at this level imply a broader dimension of time and space than do tactics. As strategy deals with wars and tactics with battles and engagements, the operational level of war is the art of winning campaigns. Its means are tactical results, and its end is the military strategic objective.

 

OFFENSE AND DEFENSE

Regardless of its type and nature or the level at which it is fought, combat manifests itself in two different but complementary forms: the offense and the defense. The offense and defense are neither mutually exclusive nor clearly distinct; as we will see, each includes elements of the other.

The offense contributes striking power. The offense generally has as its aim some positive gain; it is through the offense that we seek to impose some design on the enemy. The defense, on the other hand, contributes resisting power, the ability to preserve and protect oneself. Thus, the defense generally has a negative aim, that of resisting the enemy’s will.

The defense is inherently the stronger form of combat. Were this not the case, there would be no reason ever to assume the defensive. The offense, with its positive aim, would always be preferable. ¹² But in fact, if we are weaker than our enemy, we assume the defensive to compensate for our weakness. Similarly, if we are to mount an offensive to impose our will, we must develop enough force to overcome the inherent superiority of the enemy’s defense.

At least one party to a conflict must have an offensive intention, for without the desire to impose upon the other there would be no conflict. Similarly, the second party must at least possess a defensive desire, for without the willingness to resist there again would be no conflict. We can imagine a conflict in which both parties possess an offensive intention. But after the initial clash one of them must assume a defensive posture out of weakness until able to resume the offensive.

This leads us to the conclusion that while the defense is the stronger form of combat, the offense is the preferred form, for only through the offense can we truly pursue a positive aim. We resort to the defensive when weakness compels.

While opposing forms, the offense and defense are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they cannot exist separately. For example, the defense cannot be purely passive resistance. An effective defense must assume an offensive character, striking at the enemy at the moment of his greatest vulnerability. It is “not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows.”¹³ The truly decisive element of the defense is the counterattack. Thus, the offense is an integral component of the concept of the defense.

Similarly, the defense is an essential component of the offense.¹⁴ The offense cannot sustain itself indefinitely. At some times and places, it becomes necessary to halt the offense to replenish, and the defense automatically takes over. Furthermore, the requirement to concentrate forces at the focus of effort for the offense often necessitates assuming the defensive elsewhere. Therefore, out of necessity we must include defensive considerations as part of our concept of the offense.

This brings us to the concept of the culminating point,¹⁵ without which our understanding of the relationship between the offense and defense would be incomplete. Not only can the offense not sustain itself indefinitely, it generally grows weaker as it advances. Certain moral factors, such as morale or boldness, may increase with a successful attack, but these generally cannot compensate for the physical losses involved in sustaining an advance in the face of resistance. We advance at a cost lives, fuel, ammunition, physical and sometimes moral strength and so the attack becomes weaker over time. Eventually, the superiority that allowed us to attack and forced our enemy to defend in the first place dissipates and the balance tips in favor of our enemy. We have reached the culminating point, at which we can no longer sustain the attack and must revert to the defense. It is precisely at this point that the defensive element of the offense is most vulnerable to the offensive element of the defense,—the counterattack.

This relationship between offense and defense exists simultaneously at the various levels of war. For example, we may employ a tactical defense as part of an offensive campaign, availing ourselves of the advantages of the defense tactically while pursuing an operational offensive aim.

We conclude that there exists no clear division between the offense and defense. Our theory of war should not attempt to impose one artificially. The offense and defense exist simultaneously as necessary components of each other, and the transition from one to the other is fluid and continuous.

STYLES OF WARFARE

Just as there are two basic forms of combat, there are two essential components: fire and movement. Of all the countless activities in combat, we can distill them to these.

It would seem in theory that fire and movement represent opposite ends of a spectrum. But in reality, one cannot exist without the other, for fire and movement are complementary and mutually dependent. It is movement that allows us to bring our fires to bear on the enemy just as it is the protection of fires-that allows us to move in the face of the enemy. It is through movement that we exploit the effects of fires while it is the destructive force of fires that adds menace to our movements.

Although all warfare uses both fire and movement, these components provide the foundation for two distinct styles of warfare: an attrition style, based on firepower, and a maneuver style, based on movement. The different styles can exist simultaneously at different levels. For example, the island-hopping campaign in the Pacific during the Second World War was a maneuver campaign comprising a series of attrition battles.

Warfare by attrition seeks victory through the cumulative destruction of the enemy’s material assets by superior firepower and technology. An attritionist sees the enemy as targets to be engaged and destroyed systematically. Thus, the focus is on efficiency, leading to a methodical, almost scientific, approach to war. With the emphasis on the efficient application of massed, accurate fires, movement tends to be ponderous and tempo relatively unimportant. The attritionist gauges progress in quantitative terms: battle damage assessments, “body counts,” and terrain captured. He seeks battle under any and all conditions, pitting strength against strength to exact the greatest toll from his enemy. Results are generally proportionate to efforts; greater expenditures net greater results that is, greater attrition. The desire for volume and accuracy of fire tends to lead toward centralized control, just as the emphasis on efficiency tends to lead to-an inward focus on procedures and techniques. Success through attrition demands the willingness and ability also to withstand attrition, because warfare by attrition is costly. The greatest necessity for success is numerical superiority, and at the national level war becomes as much an industrial as a military problem. Victory does not depend so much on military competence as on sheer superiority of numbers in men and equipment.

In contrast, warfare by maneuver stems from a desire to circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage rather than meet it straight on. The goal is the application of strength against selected enemy weakness. By definition, maneuver relies on speed and surprise, for without either we cannot concentrate strength against enemy weakness. Tempo is itself a weapon often the most important. The need for speed in turn requires decentralized control. While attrition operates principally in the physical realm of war, the results of maneuver are both physical and moral. The object of maneuver is not so much to destroy physically as it is to shatter the enemy’s cohesion, organization, command, and psychological balance. Successful maneuver depends on the ability to identify and exploit enemy weakness, not simply on the expenditure of superior might. To win by maneuver, we cannot substitute numbers for skill. Maneuver thus makes a greater demand on military judgment. Potential success by maneuver unlike attrition is often disproportionate to the effort made. But for exactly the same reasons, maneuver incompetently applied carries with it a greater chance for catastrophic failure, while attrition is inherently less risky.

Because we have long enjoyed vast numerical and technological superiority, the United States has traditionally waged war by attrition. However, Marine Corps doctrine today is based on warfare by maneuver, as we will see in the fourth chapter, “The Conduct of War.”¹⁶

COMBAT POWER

Combat power is the total destructive force we can bring to bear on our enemy at a given time.¹⁷ Some factors in combat power are quite tangible and easily measured, such as superior numbers, which Clausewitz called “the most common element in victory.”¹⁸ Some may be less easily measured, such as the effects of maneuver, tempo, or surprise; the advantages established by geography or climate; the relative strengths of the offense and defense; or the relative merits of striking the enemy in the front, flanks, or rear. And some may be wholly intangible, such as morale, fighting spirit, perseverance, or the effects of leadership.

It is not our intent to try to list or categorize all the various components of combat power, to index their relative values, or to describe their combinations and variations; each combination is unique and temporary. Nor is it even desirable to be able to do so, since this would lead us to a formulistic approach to war.

CONCENTRATION AND SPEED

Of all the consistent patterns we can discern in war, there are two concepts of such significance and universality that we can advance them as principles: concentration and speed. ¹⁹

Concentration is the convergence of effort in time and space. It is the means by which we develop superiority at the decisive time and place. Concentration does not apply only to combat forces. It applies equally to all available resources: fires, aviation, the intelligence effort, logistics, and all other forms of combat support and combat service support. Similarly, concentration does not apply only to the conduct of war, but also to the preparation for war.

Effective concentration may achieve decisive local superiority for a numerically inferior force. The willingness to concentrate at the decisive place and time necessitates strict economy and the acceptance of risk elsewhere and at other times. To devote means to unnecessary efforts or excessive means to necessary secondary efforts violates the principle of concentration and is counterproductive to the true objective.

Since war is fluid and opportunities fleeting, concentration applies to time as well as to space. We must concentrate not only as the decisive location, but also at the decisive moment. Furthermore, physical concentration - massing makes us vulnerable to enemy fires, necessitating dispersion. Thus, a pattern develops: disperse, concentrate, disperse again.

Speed is rapidity of action. Like concentration, speed applies to both time and space. And, like concentration, it is relative speed that matters. Speed over time is tempo the consistent ability to operate fast²⁰. Speed over distance, or space, is velocity-the ability to move fast. Both forms are genuine sources of combat power. In other words, speed is a weapon. Superior speed allows us to seize the initiative and dictate the terms of combat, forcing the enemy to react to us. Speed provides security. It is a prerequisite for maneuver and for surprise. Moreover, speed is necessary in order to concentrate superior strength at the decisive time and place.

Since it is relative speed that matters, it follows that we should take all measures to improve our own tempo and velocity while degrading our enemy’s. However, experience shows that we cannot sustain a high rate of velocity or tempo indefinitely. As a result, another pattern develops: fast, slow, fast again. A competitive rhythm develops in combat, with each belligerent trying to generate speed when it is to his advantage.

The combination of concentration and speed is momentum ²¹ momentum generates impetus. It adds “punch” or “shock effect” to our actions. It follows that we should strike the decisive blow with the greatest possible combination of concentration and speed.

SURPRISE AND BOLDNESS

We must now acknowledge two additional considerations that are significant as multipliers of combat power: surprise and boldness.

By surprise we mean striking the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. It is not essential that we take the enemy unaware, but only that he become aware too late to react effectively. The desire for surprise is “more or less basic to all operations, for without it superiority at the decisive point is hardly conceivable.”²² But, while a necessary condition for superiority, surprise is also a genuine multiplier of strength in its own right because of its psychological effect. Surprise can decisively affect the outcome of combat far beyond the physical means at hand.

Surprise is the paralysis, if only partial and temporary, of the enemy’s ability to resist.²³ The advantage gained by surprise depends on the degree of surprise and the enemy’s ability to adjust and recover. Surprise is based on speed, secrecy, and deception. It means doing the unexpected thing, which in turn normally means doing the more difficult thing in hopes that the enemy will not expect it. In fact, this is the genesis of maneuver to circumvent the enemy’s strength to strike him where he is not prepared. Purposely choosing the more difficult course because it is less expected necessarily means sacrificing efficiency to some degree. The question is: Does the anticipated advantage gained compensate for the certain loss of efficiency that must be incurred?²⁴

While the element of surprise is often of decisive importance, we must realize that it is difficult to achieve and easy to lose. Its advantages are only temporary and must be quickly exploited. Friction, a dominant attribute of war, is the constant enemy of surprise. We must also recognize that while surprise is always desirable, the ability to achieve it does not depend solely on our own efforts. It depends at least as much on our enemy’s susceptibility to surprise—his expectations and preparedness. Our ability to achieve surprise thus rests on our ability to appreciate and then dislocate our enemy’s expectations. Therefore, while surprise can be decisive, it is a mistake to depend on it alone for the margin of victory.

Boldness is a multiplier of combat power in much the same way that surprise is, for “in what other field of human activity is boldness more at home than in war?”²⁵ Boldness “must be granted a certain power over and above successful calculations involving space, time, and magnitude of forces, for wherever it is superior, it will take advantage of its opponent’s weakness. In other words, it is a genuinely creative force.”²⁶ Boldness is superior to timidity in every instance and is at a disadvantage only in the face of nervy, calculating patience which allows the enemy to commit himself irrevocably before striking a form of boldness in its own right. Boldness must be tempered with judgment lest it border on recklessness. But this does not diminish its significance.