We Should Be Wary of a Nuclear Reaction

 

Nuclear power is being promoted by some as a potential counter against global warming. But it would make little sense to replace one global threat with another and it's hard to see what would be gained if a move towards nuclear power resulted in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. So how might a change to the way we do business with uranium affect global security?

The Government has put the issue of Australia's future nuclear industry on the table. One question under consideration is whether we should develop the capability to enrich uranium here. At the moment we export uranium in the form of yellowcake, basically mined and processed ore, but not suitable yet for use as a fuel.

Drawing an analogy to the practice of exporting raw wool for processing, the Prime Minister, John Howard, has suggested we could earn more from our uranium by performing the later steps in the process here. That could include converting yellowcake into a gas suitable for enrichment and the manufacture of enriched uranium into reactor-ready fuel elements.

The hitch is that the technology required to enrich uranium for power production is the same technology required to make weapons-grade uranium. That's why the world is concerned about Iran's activities. While Iran says its intentions in pursuing uranium enrichment are peaceful, the only difference between producing fuel-grade and weapons-grade uranium is that the latter requires many more steps.

The US supports Australia going into the enrichment business. The US President, George Bush, has proposed a global nuclear energy partnership. The basic idea is that reliable and politically stable countries, such as Australia and Canada, would become suppliers of enriched uranium to other nations.

The rationale is that world security can be improved by making it unnecessary for new entrants into the nuclear power world to develop enrichment facilities. That would reduce the number of handling steps and facilities required to operate a power program, and would simplify the task of verifying compliance with treaties and protocols.

That all makes sense and if it works, the availability on the world market of enriched uranium for power generation becomes a positive from a security point of view. The lack of an ability to enrich uranium removes the easiest breakout path to a nuclear weapon using weapons-grade uranium.

But there are problems with the partnership idea. Because of booming energy demand and longstanding political divisions, not all customers may trust the chosen suppliers to meet their demand. Those countries lacking confidence in their ability to maintain a stable, long-term relationship with the suppliers would still have an incentive to continue to develop enrichment facilities.

Also, the partnership presumes that everyone agrees with the assessment of who is to be trusted with nuclear technology (and, by implication, who is not). On that, we should do pretty well. We can point to Australia's excellent record of supporting non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have been active in bolstering support for conventions against chemical, biological and nuclear weapons for a number of decades. If we combine that with the fact that our nuclear facilities would be subject to international inspections from day one, then we can mount a pretty good case for being a trustworthy supplier.

However, it is not always intent that is factored into strategic calculations, but sometimes capability. That is much harder to argue against. Other nations might reasonably conduct their strategic planning based on what we can do rather than what we say. What is true of technology developed in Iran is also true of technology developed within Australia. Regardless of our motives, our capability to develop nuclear arms would be enhanced.

At the very least, we need to be aware of the potential sensitivities and reactions of nations in the region. We would have to be active on the diplomatic front to assuage any concerns that would arise among our neighbours. Some may welcome the opportunity to buy ready-made nuclear materials for power generation, but others may see it differently.

 

VOCABULARY LIST

Climate change

accumulation

to affect

agricultural zones

carbon dioxide

chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)

climate change

climatic zone

concentration

crop (yields)

to cut down trees

deforestation

desertification

to degrade

to deplete

drought

ecosystem

environment

flood

fresh water supplies

glacier

global warming

greenhouse effect

greenhouse gases

lower atmosphere

mean surface temperature

to melt, melting

to perturb

polar ice caps

pole

potable water

precipitation

rainfall

raw water supplies

sanitation

sea level (rise)

shift

storms

vulnerability

Pollution

aerosol sprays

agricultural wastes

anthropogenic

buildup

to burn waste

to bury, burial

byproducts

chemical fertilizer

chemical reaction

chemicals

to classify

to compost

concern

container

contamination

DDT

to deposit

dump

to emit, emission

environmental movement

flammable

fumes

garbage

groundwater

harmful substances

hazardous

to incinerate, incinerator

industrial wastes

internal combustion engine

land pollution

landfill

to leak, leakage

motor vehicle

nuclear wastes

pests

pollutant

pollution control technologies

radioactive

to recycle wastes

refuse

to release

repository

respiratory disease

rubbish

sewage

sewage-treatment solids

sewer (systems)

solid wastes

to store waste

sulfur

toxic wastes

Species Extinction

to accelerate

ancestral

to become extinct, extinction

breeding programs

descendant

to die out

endangered species

evolution

game (species)

habitat

in the wild

line

living organism

national park

natural selection

overexploitation of biological resources

overhunting

poaching

preserve

Red Data Book

reintroduction

to reproduce

reserve

species

species loss

specimen

to be suited

to survive

viable population

wildlife